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ABSTRACT
Western Europeans in the post-Cold War era enjoy unprecedented security at
home, and undertake very little strategic action abroad. The object of this paper is to
explain why they nonetheless maintain large military forces, mostly in Europe,
configured and armed primarily for territorial defense. Three general factors contribute
to Western European force structure. First, despite supranational integration and other
encroachments on its authority, the state retains control over defense policy and
substantial armed forces because these – and not international institutions -- remain the
ultimate guarantors of its independence and sovereignty. Second, in contemporary
conditions, Western Europeans face increased risk of strategic abandonment by their
superpower Ally, the United States. To avoid encouraging a U.S. withdrawal from
Europe, and to prepare for the consequences of such an eventuality, the European Allies
must maintain capabilities for self-defense and for regional strategic action. Third,
manpower-intensive territorial defense forces apply military spending disproportionately
to pay and personnel benefits, and are therefore compatible (in a way that expeditionary
militaries would not be) with the primary welfare role of the European state.
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WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING AND
FORCE STRUCTURE – TO WHAT ENDS?

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION, ITS BACKGROUND, REVIEW OF
EXISTING LITERATURE, AND OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT

A.

The Question
In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo campaign, British Defence Minister (and

NATO Secretary General-designate) Lord George Robertson remarked that European
states had dispatched only about two percent of their aggregate armed forces to the
Balkans, and this slowly and with difficulty. “If they could not use the two percent
effectively, then what, Lord Robertson asked his fellow Defense Ministers, was the use of
the remaining 98 percent of their armies.”1 What, indeed? The object of this paper is to
attempt a response to the Defence Minister‟s rhetorical question. Contemporary Europe
enjoys unprecedented internal stability and freedom from external threat, while it
employs military power abroad on only the most limited scale; why, then, do the states of
Western Europe still maintain large armed forces?

1

Elizabeth Becker, “European Allies to Spend More on Weapons,” New York Times (22 September
1999), Section A, p. 11 (emphasis added). Online. ProQuest Central. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
index=90&did=45029342&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VNa
me=PQD&TS=1256846512&clientId=4463&aid=3. Accessed on 22 June 2009.
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B.

European Strategic Policy: Some General Points and Some Well-Known
Explanations
Europeans do not fight wars; or, more precisely – and with some diversity among

the policies of individual states2 – the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization have been far less disposed to undertake military action than is the United
States. This phenomenon is well-recognized and widely discussed; it is clearly reflected
in data for combat operations, for non-combat deployments (such as peacekeeping and
stabilization missions), for casualties, and for combat and expeditionary capabilities.
The existing literature, taken together, affords a persuasive explanation of
divergence between European and American strategic policy. First, attributing it chiefly
to the transatlantic disparity in military power, Robert Kagan‟s work3 sets forth a
“capabilities thesis.” The U.S. occupies a “unipolar” position: though by no means
omnipotent, it has no serious challenger for global strategic leadership,4 and is without
peer in its ability to wage war and to project power abroad – capabilities that the
European states, with partial and limited exceptions, do not possess. This capabilities gap
influences psychology, ideology and world view, making the European states far less
willing than the U.S. to pursue policy objectives by military means.
A valuable complement to the capabilities thesis rests on principles of political
economy – specifically, the implications of the “exploitation thesis” for the distribution

2

The U.K., for example, is closest to the U.S. in willingness to engage in combat and to accept
casualties. Germany, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is subject both to unique constitutional
constraints and special political considerations. The general tendency, though qualified by a degree of
diversity, is substantial and pervasive.
3
The thesis is set forth comprehensively in Kagan‟s Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in
the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).
4
There are, however, numerous challengers seeking positions of regional hegemony; this is, for
example, the aspiration to which Russia is reduced.
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of costs in providing public security goods.5 A strategic interest is a “public good” to the
extent that the producer cannot practicably withhold the benefit from others.6 A large
and wealthy state has greater means to produce public security goods, and derives greater
benefit from them, than do smaller countries. The theory predicts that it will take steps to
produce its desired level of security, even if other states that enjoy benefit withhold active
assistance.7 Smaller (and weaker) states, therefore, can enjoy a “free ride” on the efforts
of the great power – can benefit from the public security goods it provides, without
making proportionate contributions.8 The relative efforts and costs borne by the U.S.,
and by its European Allies, are broadly consistent with the predictions of the exploitation
thesis: the “unipolar” U.S. contributes a disproportionate share, while the smaller powers
of Western Europe under-contribute in proportion to the benefits they may receive.9 For
the many security interests that are public goods, therefore, economic theory points in the
same direction as Kagan‟s capabilities thesis.

5

The leading exposition is in Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of
Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966): 266-279. Online. JSTOR.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082. Accessed on 12 May 2009. For a later work elaborating on the
theory as applied to NATO (and proposing various refinements and qualifications not here material) see
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and Into the Twentieth
Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999). The phrase “exploitation hypothesis”
appears in Sandler and Hartley at pp. 34-36.
6
Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” p. 267. Public security goods may
include, among others, containment of dangerous common adversaries; prevention of conflict in vital
regions; freedom of the seas and airways; access to economically critical resources; arms control and nonproliferation; etc. Security goods, to be sure, may be “impurely” public -- not equally available to or
enjoyed by all beneficiaries; and particular military measures may produce more than one kind of security
benefit. See Sandler and Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO, pp. 34-36.
7
Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” pp. 269, 272, 274.
8
Ibid., pp. 274, 278.
9
As for strategic capabilities and actions outside Europe, the evidence is unambiguous, in the scale of
U.S. overseas military deployments; in deployment capabilities; in blue-water naval formations; and in at
least some military actions (for example, the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991). All of these have, at
least in part, served to advance public strategic goods such as freedom of the seas, Persian Gulf security,
deterrence of potential aggression in East Asia, suppression of international terrorism, and others. Western
European contributions to these efforts, weighed collectively, have ranged from limited to negligible. By
contrast, the Western European states have always made significant contributions to security and stability
within Europe -- an interest shared by the U.S., but more immediately affecting Europeans.
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A diverse body of scholarship, meanwhile, emphasizes aspects of European
political culture evolving in the postwar era that likewise incline European states against
military action. First, the discrediting of and European retreat from imperial power
eliminated a leading basis for strategic engagement abroad. As noted by Hurrell and
Menon, decolonization reduced even the strongest of the imperial powers to second-rank
status; profoundly affected domestic society and politics; and propelled a reorientation of
their foreign policies and economic relations firmly toward Europe.10 Second, as Tony
Judt has argued, the central and defining feature of the European order, and the chief end
of state power, has become the implementation of “the „European model of society‟” -the welfare state11 -- in which military power is a disfavored alternative to social
spending.12 Third, though the state remains the locus of security policy, it suffers from a
“legitimacy squeeze.” Economic and political integration,13 and internationalist theories
of political authority,14 strengthen supranational and multilateral processes at the expense
of the state. Meanwhile, as Le Galés and Crozier find, consumer culture, individualism,
“identity” politics, and attenuated nationalism diminish citizens‟ deference to state

10

Andrew Hurrell and Anand Menon, “International Relations, International Institutions, and the
European State,” in Governing Europe, eds. Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 395-412, at p. 406.
11
Tony Judt, Postwar: A Brief History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005),
pp. 748, 792-3.
12
Malcolm Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate – Widening or Fragmenting?” International
Affairs 77, no. 3 (July 2001): 569-585, at p. 577. Online. Military & Government Collection.
http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=485
6459&site=ehost-live&scope=site. Accessed on 13 February 2007.
13
Robert Cooper, “Integration and Disintegration,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 1 (1999): 8-21, at
p. 16. Online. Project MUSE – Basic College Collection. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ journal_of _
democracy/v010/10.1cooper.html. Accessed on 8 May 2007.
14
Jed Rubenfeld, “The Two World Orders,” The Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 22-36, at
p. 25. Online. ProQuest Research Library. http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://proquest.
umi.com/pqdweb?did=465703261&sid=6&Fmt=4&clientId=4463&RQT=309&VName=PQD. Accessed
on 3 April 2007.
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authority.15 The nation-state‟s freedom of action is impaired by its loss of political
supremacy, its new “intermediate position between sub-national and international
constraints and demands.”16 This trend is peculiarly prominent, perhaps uniquely
influential, in Western Europe.

C.

Overview of the Argument
The literature, in short, affords persuasive explanations for the relative aversion of

America‟s European Allies to military action. What it does not address directly or fully
is their continued maintenance of large military forces -- despite the disinclination to use
them for global strategic contingencies, and the attenuation of proximate threats.
Before 1990, there were obvious and important reasons for transatlantic
differences in force structure and deployment.17 The persistence of the pattern since then
is another matter. Though the Russian threat is diminished and physically more remote,
though no other significant conventional threat to Continental security has appeared, the
European NATO states still generally favor large but static manpower-intensive
militaries, configured primarily for territorial defense. Ill-suited, and little used, for any
other operational exigency, they are far less deployable, and far less deployed, than U.S.

15

Patrick Le Galès, “The Changing European State: Pressures From Within,” in Governing Europe,
eds. Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 380-394, at pp. 391393. See also Michel J. Crozier, “Western Europe,” in The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press,
1975), pp. 11-57, at pp. 47-48.
16
Hanns W. Maull, “Europe and the Changing Global Agenda,” in The New Europe: Politics,
Government and Economy Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Story (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 140160, at p. 146.
17
The U.S. had a uniquely global strategic posture, necessitating forward positions in Europe and East
Asia, and significant power projection capabilities, especially air and naval forces, as well as a large
strategic nuclear arsenal. Between 1945 and 1991, most of the European states (with partial exceptions for
the U.K. and France, which maintained some global strategic capabilities and had greater defense
expenditures), were concerned primarily with territorial defense, and so maintained large land armies, with
substantial complements of manpower but comparatively lower capital investment.
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forces (even their reserve components). Military service no longer functions in Western
Europe as the “school of the nation” -- if only because it is mostly voluntary, and the
remaining conscription regimes no longer universal. Nor do European militaries play a
significant role in routine domestic security functions.
Why, then, do the Western European NATO states maintain their substantial but
largely immobile land forces? My research suggests that the answer lies at the
conjunction of interstate strategic politics and domestic socio-economic policy.18
First, exclusive control of military power has long been a core element of state
sovereignty; it stands in sharper relief, in an era of diminished state authority. Nor is this
mere symbolism: even in a Europe of unprecedented peace and order, armed force
remains the ultimate defense of a state‟s vital interests. The European Union‟s effort to
construct a framework for military action to serve its own policies illustrates the political
significance of strategic capabilities; it also exhibits the member states‟ reluctance to
diminish their own sovereignty.
Second, each of the Western European members of NATO must manage alliance
politics and its hazards. Divergence of strategic interests, and differences of mutual
dependence, emphasize the danger of abandonment by an ally in time of need. The end
of the Cold War both reduced systemic pressure on the U.S. to cater to its allies, and
elevated the U.S. to “unipolar” power which -- with European strategic parochialism --

18

I confine my analysis to the Western European NATO states. They possess the greater part of
Europe‟s economic and military potential; their sovereignty is well-established, not recently emerged from
Soviet domination. Greece and Turkey, meanwhile, have atypical geopolitical positions, and armed forces
unique in NATO. Unless otherwise indicated, I address the militaries of the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Portugal.

9

has aggravated strategic divergence. The European members of NATO must then seek to
prevent, and to prepare for the consequences of, strategic abandonment by the U.S.
Europeans are chiefly concerned with security problems in Europe and its
outskirts. NATO and the U.S. provide insurance against the low but catastrophic risk of
war in Europe. Lest U.S. intervention be rendered futile, and the U.S. commitment to
NATO be undermined, the European Allies must maintain adequate defense forces within
Europe. Meanwhile, to manage abandonment‟s possible effects, they need forces capable
of dealing with the regional challenges that are of far greater concern to Europeans than
to the U.S. One approach has been pursuit of EU military capabilities; this limited
experiment is far outweighed, however, by the members‟ own sovereign forces. These
serve, moreover, as a hedge against the failure of European integration itself, which could
occasion the return to Europe of old-fashioned power politics.
Finally, military forces configured for territorial defense are relatively compatible
with the primary role of the state in Western Europe as dispenser of public welfare
benefits. In general, military spending and welfare-state priorities are opponents in a
zero-sum game (advantage to the latter). But spending on military payroll, benefits and
“consumption,” to support armies stationed at home, contributes to consensus objectives
of economic redistribution and social stability, by providing public-sector employment
and complementing civilian benefits programs.
Domestic political priorities, therefore, move in the same channel as state
sovereignty interests and the counsels of strategic policy. They all heavily favor
substantial territorial defense armies over alternatives – especially over smaller and more
deployable forces usable in response to global contingencies.

10

II.

WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES -- SCALE, STRUCTURE,
AND DEPLOYMENT
As an initial matter, it is proper to describe common characteristics of Western

European NATO members‟ armed forces, and to compare them in configuration and use
with those of the United States. Despite considerable military diversity among these
states, key data disclose a prevalent pattern.

A.

NATO European Forces and Deployability
First, though their forces are smaller than those of the U.S. in raw numbers and in

proportion to population, the Western European members of the Alliance have substantial
military manpower. In 2008, total active-duty military personnel numbered roughly
1.159 million, with an additional 1.067 million troops in reserve formations; drawn from
a combined population of roughly 353.8 million.19 In terms of the numbers of men and
women under command, these are large military organizations.20
European forces have long been constituted and armed primarily for a territorial
defense role. Throughout the Cold War, they prepared for warfare within a few hundred
miles of their own territory, a priority reflected throughout their logistical and support
arrangements21 as well as in their armament. Despite the end of the bipolar confrontation

19

Data (current as of November 2008) are from the 2009 edition of The Military Balance (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). Active duty forces exclude national paramilitary police
(Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, etc.) whose functions are chiefly law enforcement and domestic security.
Reserve forces include such organizations as Britain‟s Territorial Army units and Norway‟s Home Guard.
20
In 2008, by comparison, the U.S. had 1.539 million active duty military personnel (0.51 percent of a
population of roughly 303.8 million), plus 979,000 in various reserve formations. The data referred to in
this discussion, mostly from annual editions of The Military Balance, are set forth in Appendix B.
21
Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, “As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink,” The
Washington Post (July 29, 1996), Section A, p. 1. Online. LexisNexis Academic. http://www.lexisnexis.
com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T6358796688. Accessed on 19 February 2009.
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focused in the heart of Europe, in the mid-1990s the European Allies remained notably
dependent on the U.S. for logistics, command and control, transport, and other
capabilities;22 nor has the picture altered appreciably since then.
The persistence of the Western European orientation toward territorial defense,
and concomitantly against expeditionary warfare, is demonstrable through a comparison
with the U.S. on key measures of strategic mobility. A proxy for expeditionary capability
can be derived from airlift (in numbers of transport, cargo and tanker aircraft) and sealift
(numbers of seagoing vessels for cargo, supply, fuel, transport, command, and similar
functions beyond coastal waters). These assets are indispensable for the delivery and
support of substantial forces in operations beyond their home region.23 Hence, the ratios
of a state‟s aircraft and vessels in these two categories, to its total active-duty military
personnel, provide a rough but useful measure of expeditionary orientation.
Pertinent data are set forth in Appendix B (pp. 2-4).24 Among the Western
European states, a degree of diversity is observable. The U.K. leads consistently in the
seagoing logistical capacity ratio of vessels to troops, yet has ranged between one-third

22

Ibid., p. 1 (citation omitted).
Their critical importance is illustrated by the experience of the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991. Initial
rapid deployment of a deterrent force to Saudi Arabia was possible only by means of U.S. Air Force
strategic airlift assets, which in the first two days of operations flew 91 missions to Saudi Arabia, and more
than 70 daily thereafter. Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Governments, Societies, and Armed Forces: What the
Gulf War Portends,” Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 2-21, at p. 5. Online. Military & Government
Collection. http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=
mth&AN= 1994441&site=ehost-live&scope=site. Accessed on 6 January 2009. Even the relatively
modest French deployment of 16,500 troops required partial U.S. airlift assistance. Ibid., p. 7.
Meanwhile, movement of heavy forces – vehicles for armored and mechanized units, most other
equipment, supplies and munitions, and logistical support facilities for a large expedition – was carried by
sealift. “[T]hrough the entirety of Desert Shield and Storm, roughly 95 percent of everything required was
moved by sea. . . .” Ibid., p. 6. In general, “[s]ealift remains the principal means of moving vast amounts
of supplies required by even a relatively small force.” Ibid., p. 18.
Other assets useful in power projection are either not needed in all cases (e.g., intercontinental
bombers); or are more crucial for other purposes (e.g., main battle tanks, for territorial defense; etc.).
24
From The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), various annual
editions.
23
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and two-thirds that of the U.S. It is followed not too distantly by Germany and Italy;
France, after major reductions in the late 1990s, is far behind.25 Since 1990, meanwhile,
the leading European states (U.K and France) have had airlift-to-troops ratios one-third to
one-half the U.S. level. Even British and French force structures, which have sustained a
disproportionate share of European deployments, are not primarily expeditionary in
character. U.S. deployability ratios have exceeded those of other large states, Germany,
Italy and Spain, by factors between two and seven.
The overall picture is perhaps more striking. In 2007, Western European NATO
states (with 1.212 million active-duty troops) possessed a total of 554 transport aircraft,
and 79 seagoing logistical support ships. The U.S., with 1.506 million troops, had 1907
transport aircraft, and 216 sealift vessels. The chief difference in 1990, on both sides,
was a larger number of troops.26 Despite the lower likelihood of major conflict in Europe
relative to other regions, the vast gap between U.S. and European deployability,
characteristic of the Cold War, persists.

B.

Force Deployment Patterns
The implications of contrasting U.S. and European force structures are amplified

by data showing the proportion of active-duty forces deployed or stationed abroad27
during the post-Cold War period. Not only operational deployments, but the long-term
25

Several smaller states -- Denmark and Belgium -- have had higher sealift-to-troops ratios than larger
powers; due chiefly to the disproportionate effect on the ratio of a few additional ships, where active-duty
force numbers are relatively low (in 2008, roughly 39,000 for Belgium and 30,000 for Denmark).
26
The same European states, with 2.229 million men under arms, had virtually the same number of both
transport aircraft (567) and sealift vessels (78) as they did sixteen years later; while the U.S., with 2.118
million troops, possessed 1853 transport aircraft, and 239 sealift ships.
27
For purposes of these comparisons, I exclude forces stationed within Western Europe, which for
Europeans is, of course, not “abroad.” This excludes substantial U.S. and British, as well as some French,
forces, most in Germany. Addition of the figures for U.S. and other forces “abroad” in Europe would
render still more emphatic the leading U.S., and British, positions in foreign military commitments.
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positioning of forces abroad – as deterrent or potential response to overseas threats -reflects a commitment to the projection of power as an instrument of policy. Deployment
data are in Appendix A.
For 1990-1991, excluding operational deployments to the Persian Gulf theater,
approximately 7.5 percent of U.S. forces were stationed or deployed overseas, followed
closely by both the U.K. and France at about 7.0 percent. To this must be added the
short-term Gulf deployments, as of early 1991: U.S., 697,000 (an additional 32.9 percent
of total active-duty U.S. forces); U.K., 45,000 (another 14.8 percent); and France, 16,500
(3.6 percent).28 Forces deployed by the other European allies during this period were in
general de minimis, and far below British and French levels.
In 1996-1997, with substantial deployments in the Balkans, the French and British
proportions roughly equaled that of the U.S., at about ten percent; Germany, Italy and
Spain stood at less than two percent. In 2002, the U.S. (with 8700 troops in Afghanistan
and its neighbors) and France had comparable deployment percentages of about 11
percent; the U.K. stood at 7.6 percent.29
The differences in 2005-2006 reflect, above all, the Iraq campaign: 25.2 percent
of U.S. active-duty forces were deployed, including 139,700 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The U.K., at 9.7 percent, had 9500 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan; France, 8.5 percent,
1265 troops in Afghanistan. Denmark and the Netherlands, at 6.5 percent and 5.8
percent, had 566 and 1115 troops, respectively, between Afghanistan and Iraq. On the
28

McCausland, “What the Gulf War Portends,” at pp. 9-10. Other NATO members deployed modest
contingents to the Gulf: Italy, 1200 (0.3% of active-duty forces); Netherlands, 600 (0.6 %); Spain, 500
(0.18%); Belgium, 400 (0.43%); Denmark, 100 (0.32%); and Norway, 50 (0.15%). See “Military Statistics
– Gulf War Coalition Forces By Country.” Online. http://www.Nationmaster.com/ graph/mil_gul_war_
coa_for-military-gulf-war-coalition-forces. Accessed on 26 February 2007.
29
Smaller states Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands were in these years conspicuous for relatively
high deployment percentages (the majority for Balkans peacekeeping).
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other hand, only 2.5 percent of German, 4.7 percent of Italian, and 1.8 percent of Spain‟s
forces were serving abroad. In 2008, British and French deployments reached,
respectively, 12.2 percent (12,450 in Iraq and Afghanistan), and 10 percent (3035 in
Afghanistan), while the U.S. remained in the lead, but by a lower margin.30
These data demonstrate a hierarchy of expeditionary activity and capability, led
by the U.S., with the U.K. and France typically close, or next in rank, with seven to
twelve percent of forces deployed. The position of France is subject to significant
qualification: its vigorous pursuit of private pseudo-imperial interests, especially in
Africa, by military means31 accounts for a large share of its deployments; while its, at
best, parsimonious approach to any action in coalition with the U.S. contrasts sharply
with the U.K. All other Western European NATO states have lower deployment
percentages -- in most cases far lower -- than the U.K. and France.32 Germany, Italy, and
Spain are conspicuously reluctant to send forces abroad.

30

The U.S. deployment percentage decline from 2005 appears to reflect return of some forces from Iraq
and Afghanistan to the U.S. and Germany, replaced by units from Japan and South Korea.
31
French participation in operations advancing public security objectives -- in the Persian Gulf War, in
Iraq, and in Afghanistan – is dwarfed by that of the U.K. Most French troops overseas are stationed in
former (or present) French possessions in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, serving primarily unilateral
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32
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A further characteristic of Western European deployments is noteworthy: most of
the Allies (except the U.K. and France) have disproportionately favored local and
regional operations. In sample years 1996-97 and 2002-03, three quarters or more of
most Continental NATO states‟ deployments were for peacekeeping and stabilization in
Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia. Similarly, in 2008, several states had proportionally large
commitments to UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, a nearby Mediterranean littoral country.33
These patterns illustrate a strongly regional emphasis in European military priorities (and
probably also a preference for peacekeeping over combat).

C.

Territorial Defense: Core Purpose of European Militaries
The primacy of territorial defense for Western European armed forces, and their

limited deployment capabilities, are widely reflected in the literature. Yet a defining
feature of the post-Cold War period has been the diminution of conventional military
threats in Europe.34 Contemporary European planning rests on the assumption that there
exists little or no risk of external, conventional, land-based attack against mainland
Europe in the next two decades; even Russia is not expected in this period to field
sufficient forces to undertake major aggression.35 European academic and policy
thinking has indeed purported to transcend defense, emphasizing a broader if less
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coherent notion of “security”; but military structures and reforms have not kept pace,36
and show limited response to the emergence of new potential threats abroad.
Instead, “despite post-Cold War rhetoric,” European armies differ from their Cold
War predecessors chiefly in reduced scale.37 Their core purpose remains defense of
national territory against external threat.38 Formal statements of policy widely reiterate
territorial defense as a central rationale for armed forces and military spending.39 More
fundamentally, this role is embodied in the habits of states (reflected in deployment data),
36
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in public expectations, in the institutional cultures of military organizations themselves -impeding strategic reorientation in light of contemporary global conditions.40
The U.K., and to a lesser extent France, with deployment capabilities and
overseas military dispositions at the high end of the Western European spectrum, are
partial exceptions.41 Beginning with the Balkans wars of the mid-1990‟s, the other major
European states -- Germany, Italy, and Spain -- showed a modestly increased willingness
to participate, on a small scale, in selected multilateral operations abroad; but their armies
are still framed primarily for territorial defense, and based on home soil.42
The greater proportion of all Western European forces is considered “nondeployable.” By one estimate, at the end of 2004, the 18 European states in NATO‟s
integrated command structure could deploy only 50 brigades; assuming force rotation
requirements, only about 40,000 troops would be available for combat missions at any
moment.43 Material constraints on deployability have arisen from two sources: legal
restrictions on the role of conscripts; and the failure to train, organize and equip most
units for expeditionary operations.44
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In the late 1990s, most NATO members still maintained conscription regimes that
barred or restricted deployment of draftees outside national territory.45 Despite relatively
limited training, expertise, and flexibility, conscripts were politically suited to territorial
defense, and had been needed as a reservoir of manpower to meet the hordes of the
Warsaw Pact.46 Conscript forces proved unwieldy, however, even for regional
peacekeeping in the Balkans.47 Since the late 1990s the significance of conscription has
diminished markedly; of the major European powers only Germany now retains it.48
The marginal status of expeditionary capability and action is today reflected
chiefly in states‟ reluctance to finance and organize forces for greater deployability, and
in political resistance to military operations. Whether for combat or peacekeeping,
foreign deployments are politically “contested,” as well as expensive.49 To square this
circle, many European states have developed, in effect, two forces. The far greater
proportion of active-duty troops constitutes a “bulk” military stationed at home, dedicated
to territorial defense, “unreformed” in structure and training, and comparatively poorly
funded.50 In parallel, small elite units are trained, financed and equipped for
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peacekeeping or combat deployments, mostly on a multilateral basis.51
This bifurcation is evident, for example, in the Germany force structure.
The Bundeswehr of the 1990s incorporated “two armies” – a far larger and less wellequipped main force, including a substantial number of conscripts, dedicated to territorial
defense; and a much smaller “crisis reaction component,” all professionals, with superior
equipment, prepared for out-of-area operations.52 This was much the same in 2007. A
proposed long-term defense reform could ultimately improve deployability.53 But in the
near to mid-term, the Bundeswehr can send only a fraction of its troops abroad at any
time: with unit rotation requirements, it was said in 2007 to be “overstretched” at the
modest deployment level of 3.7 percent.54 Reconfiguring a larger portion of the
Bundeswehr for an expeditionary role would require large investments in training,
equipment, support capabilities and reorganization, and less reliance on conscription.
Budget constraints, including continued heavy spending on non-deployable conscripts,
have impeded reform.55 German military spending in general favors salaries and
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personnel benefits – about 55 percent of the 2007 defense budget.56 This entrenched
priority, and political barriers to budget increases, impede serious efforts to improve
deployability.57 Meanwhile, conscription remains a consensus policy fixture. It is cited
as the basis for a mobilization capability that ensures continued U.S. participation in
NATO,58 and as an institutional guarantee of strategic reticence: “[a] citizen‟s army is a
prudent hedge against military interventionism around the world.”59
As all this demonstrates -- as a 2006 Defence Ministry White Paper expressly
stated -- “[d]efending Germany against external military threats is and remains the
Bundeswehr‟s core function.”60 Beside this central, consensus role, Germany‟s limited
peacekeeping and stabilization missions are both peripheral and exceptional.
The attention to Germany in the literature does not imply invidious comparison to
other large states, Italy and Spain. Both have lately abandoned conscription; both possess
appreciable numbers of amphibious ships and craft (Germany does not);61 both
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contributed forces to the Coalition in Iraq;62 and Spain‟s purchases of transport aircraft
have given it an airlift ratio superior to Germany‟s. In other respects, however, these two
states are inferior, or at best comparable, to Germany in expeditionary capability (sealift
and airlift) and performance (deployments abroad). And even British and French forces - the most potent, flexible and deployable in Europe -- are markedly less capable of
power projection and expeditionary operations than those of the U.S.
Though there are important differences among NATO Europe‟s military forces, it
is nonetheless clear that all of the Continental militaries share a predominant orientation
toward territorial defense. This, despite the attenuation of external conventional threats,
through the military retreat and weakening of Russia, and the considerable progress in
consolidating Europe, including much of its eastern marches, under the banners of both
NATO and the EU.
Thus, again, Lord George Robertson‟s question: what is the purpose of these
large, yet mostly undeployed, mostly non-deployable forces?
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III.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

A.

Armed Forces and Statehood: Substance and Symbol
The first part of an answer to this question rests upon the long-standing and vital

nexus between authority over military forces and sovereign statehood.
In many respects the state‟s authority has been diminished: from above by
multilateralism and European integration, from within by a variety of domestic social and
political changes.63 The nation-state nonetheless remains the primary locus of democratic
legitimacy.64 As such, it naturally holds an effective monopoly on the affirmative use of
military power,65 accountable to the national public that mans and pays for it. Yet state
control of armed forces is also a matter of potent necessity. Military power is still a
cornerstone of the state‟s authority, independence, its very existence (albeit a cornerstone
obscured by the recession of external military threats, the prevalence of intra-European
peace, and an exuberant overgrowth of postmodern internationalism).
It may be a truism, but one worthy of occasional acknowledgment, that “[t]he
fundamental objective of every nation is to secure its vital interests while maintaining its
own standards and values.”66 The ability to employ physical force against threats to a
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state‟s territorial integrity and political independence, and to secure other life-and-death
interests, is the ultima ratio of sovereign statehood, the last resort for its preservation.
Were a state to rely, not on its own power, but on the kindness of strangers for the
vindication of its vital interests, it would necessarily also cede to others the authority to
determine what those interests are and how to advance them. A state in such position has
foregone the substance of its independence.
This is not to suggest that a state must be able to defend itself alone against any
and all adversaries. Participation in a coalition or alliance is quite compatible with
sovereignty, where the cooperating members share a predominant common purpose. In
joining such a group, however, the individual state must be able to contribute capabilities
French Ministry of Defence, “The French Defence Policy -- France‟s Strategic Goals: Defend Our
Interests.” Online. http://www.defense.gouv.fr./defense_uk/enjeux_defense/politique_ de_defense/
objectifs_strategiques/les_objectifs_strategiques_de_la_france. Accessed on 25 October 2009 (“France‟s
vital interests . . . lie in the preservation of the territory‟s integrity . . . [and] in the free exercise of its
sovereignty. . . .”).
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integrada que o Estado portug
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and resources useful to the group‟s ends. Otherwise its allies, deeming the state‟s
participation of small account, or even dispensable, will tend both to disregard its
preferences and to exact a price for any protection they confer.
National defense capabilities remain necessary, despite the apparent prevalence of
stability and peace in Europe.67 This is true not only for the larger powers, but also for
the smaller states: if they wish to avoid political dependence on France and Germany,
and to participate in the councils in which strategic policy is discussed and influenced,68
states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway must maintain the ability to make
valuable contributions to coalition defense.
Above this enduring foundation of strategic substance has risen a more visible
superstructure of political symbolism. Security and defense policy are widely seen as the
“last bastion of national sovereignty.”69 Maintenance of, and direct control over, armed
forces have become attributes of the sovereignty and political independence that they
actually exist to preserve.70 This is best illustrated by the efforts (described below) of the
European Union to develop military capabilities.
Thus military power is a badge of sovereignty. More fundamentally, however, it
is the ultimate defense and arbiter of sovereignty, and a medium of exchange among
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states collaborating in the pursuit of common strategic purposes. Token or ceremonial
militaries do not suffice: these purposes require armed forces in scale and kind capable
of material contribution to the defense of vital state interests.

B.

European Integration and Military Power
As the ultimate sanction of independence, the possession of and command over

military power have, by a natural process of association, become public symbols of state
sovereignty, even political identity. This is illustrated by efforts to promote defense
policy integration in Europe. European states‟ reluctance to embrace these initiatives at
the expense of their own authority, meanwhile, points to the irreducible substance
underlying the symbolism.
(1).

ESDP in Outline

The leading institutional challenge to the sovereignty of European states arises
from European integration. Under strong currents of policy convergence, broad swaths
of authority are now shared between national capitals and the supranational European
Union; but matters of defense, security and foreign policy have remained essentially
national.71 Since the early 1990s, however, the EU has worked gradually to develop a
European Security and Defense Policy (“ESDP”).
ESDP is an institutional framework to devise EU policy on matters of common
interest in foreign affairs and military matters; it is also a platform for the application of
71
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military power to advance common aims. The 1992 Petersberg conference defined a set
of military functions for EU attention: humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis
management, and limited peacemaking operations.72 Spurred by the experience of the
Balkan wars, the EU‟s 1999 Helsinki conference set new goals for ESDP including,
above all, a “rapid reaction” force of 60,000 troops, dispatchable on two months‟ notice
and sustainable for a year in the field, with a complement of aircraft and ships.73
On foreign and defense policy, the EU acts on the basis of intergovernmental
cooperation, without authority to bind any unwilling member state; indeed, any policy or
action requires unanimous assent.74 Under the proposed Treaty of Lisbon, successor to
the rejected EU Constitution, “[m]ilitary capabilities remain in national hands,” and “all
contributions to [EU military operations] will always be on a voluntary basis.”75 All
military units, equipment and financial support for ESDP actions must be subscribed by
member states from their own standing forces and budgets;76 they remain subject to the
contributor‟s sovereign authority, and can be withheld as a matter of course from any
proposed operation.77
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(2).

ESDP and the “European Project”

ESDP‟s purpose has not been only, or even primarily, means for collective
responses to security problems; it is also aimed at the deepening of European integration
as an end in itself.78 This project is not universally accepted; 2005 French and Dutch
referenda rejected a proposed EU constitution, suggesting that construction of a European
political identity has limited momentum beyond the circles of the Eurocracy.79 Its
proponents have thus deliberately pursued a process of European “nation-building,” to
enhance EU political legitimacy through formation of a European identity, a collective
supranational self-awareness.80 By vesting the EU with some role in framing strategic
policy, and some capability to carry it into effect, ESDP would appropriate the symbolic
value of military power as an attribute of political sovereignty, and would thereby serve
as a focal point for nation-building -- a means for the EU to increase its stature at home as
well as on the global stage.81
(3).

EU Member States: Reticence and Reservations

After the 1999 Helsinki Declaration, EU members soon earmarked impressive
troop strength for ESDP functions (subject to the right to withhold them from operations).
Yet critical deficiencies were quickly evident -- in the sophisticated equipment, command

78

Ibid., p. 233.
Stephanie Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified:
Nation-Building and Identity in the European Union,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 1 (October 2006):
24-42, at p. 31. Online. SAGE Journals Online. http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/33/1/24. Accessed on
23 December 2008.
80
Ibid., p. 30. To the extent that ESDP‟s main purpose is “to bolster an endogenous process of statebuilding” rather than to defend Europe, one observer argues, it threatens “to detach the actor from the
strategic environment” so that strategy and policy “come to be driven by internal politics rather than
external realities.” Julian Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing,”
International Affairs 78, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 789-811, at p. 809. Online. Military & Government
Collection. http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&
db=mth&AN=7502666&site=ehost-live&scope=site. Accessed on 3 January 2009.
81
Anderson and Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified,” p. 29.
79

28

and control, and logistical support required for effective operational deployment.82 EU
members have since repeatedly failed to meet self-imposed targets for ESDP capabilities,
and in 2004 -- purportedly as an interim measure -- agreed to replace the “rapid reaction”
force with a modest array of small “battlegroups.”83
Limited capabilities are reflected in limited operations. The largest to date, the
EU‟s succession to NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, involved at peak 7000 troops; most
other ESDP missions have been primarily civilian; all have been militarily unambitious in
scope.84 This is less a matter of resource limitations than of political constraints: the
dependence of any operation on an essentially ad hoc process of coalition formation, on
finding voluntarily contributed forces and funds, and on averting exercise of the veto
implicit in the unanimity requirement.85
For ESDP to organize usable power, EU members must compromise traditional
sovereign control over (their) forces and military policy.86 This is, in the near future,
unlikely. Many observers rightly emphasize strategic divergence between the U.S. and
“Europeans,” yet it does not imply convergence of policies and interests within Europe.
To the contrary, EU members are strongly differentiated in their approaches to security,
in their attitudes to the use of force, power projection, foreign intervention, and to the

82

Clarke and Cornish, “The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit,” pp. 784-785. By 2006,
seven of the 64 identified shortfalls had been “resolved.” Shepherd, “Irrelevant or Indispensable?” p. 75.
83
Menon, “Empowering Paradise?” p. 233. Two of the 13 “battlegroups,” of 1500-2200 troops each,
are to be on “standby” at any time for action within 15 days and sustainable for a month in the field. Paul
Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,”
International Affairs 81, no. 4 (July 2005): 801-820, at pp. 804-805. Online. Military & Government
Collection. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=106&sid=98e3bcf2-00ee-4d2b-bcf662e5c14f3486%40sessionmgr111. Accessed on 28 July 2009.
84
Menon, “Empowering Paradise?” pp. 229-230.
85
Ibid., pp. 235-237, 238-239.
86
Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno?” p. 811.

29

proper balance between power and political influence.87 The “Atlanticism” of the U.K,
the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, persistently contrasts with “Europeanism” in
France, Spain and Belgium.88 Partly for this reason, Europeans do not accept any one
state as their natural leader in defense policy;89 further, those states with relatively
capable forces have stronger misgivings at the prospect of submitting them to the
political control of others.90
To the extent, then, that ESDP betrays a persistent “gap between rhetoric and
capacity, between the real world and the EU world,”91 it is chiefly because EU members
resist the diminution of their own sovereignty, and insist on consensus as the basis for
collaboration under the EU flag.92 Cession of more substantial defense authority to the
EU would compromise a key residual block of members‟ exclusive sovereign power;
indeed, it might well mark a point of no return for the post-Westphalian state in Europe.
There is no great disposition among EU members to take this leap beyond current
intergovernmental cooperation on defense policy.93
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C.

Conclusion
Efforts to cultivate EU-directed military capabilities, and the reluctance of EU

members to sacrifice the substance of their military authority, are pertinent here to
demonstrate the political significance of military resources and command. To the EU and
the proponents of further European integration, military capabilities are a visible public
symbol of autonomous political identity: more a vehicle for the ideational project of
“constructing Europe” than an instrument of usable power. Armed forces bear symbolic
value for the states too; value that may be particularly important in a climate of political
integration, regarded with hesitancy by substantial parts of their national constituencies.
Unlike the EU, however, the states have a more fundamental, more substantial reason to
maintain significant military power: their independence and territorial integrity rest
ultimately on the ability to defend them against armed threat or attack. For the states of
Europe, armed forces are not primarily symbols; they are still “the first and last bastions
of sovereignty.”94
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IV.

THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA AND EUROPEAN ARMED
FORCES
Relations among allies entail two opposing dangers – “entrapment” in another‟s

policies, and “abandonment” by an ally when its aid is needed. Mutual interdependence
mitigates, and strategic divergence aggravates, these hazards. With the end of the Cold
War, the unipolar U.S. is less concerned with NATO cohesion, and more interested in
exigent problems beyond stable Europe. Hence the Western European NATO states must
deal with the risk of abandonment by the leader of their Alliance. By reason of proximity
(and with U.S.-provided global public security), Europeans are most concerned with
security problems in Europe and environs. Management of the abandonment hazard
therefore demands local and regional military capabilities, both to limit the risk of U.S.
withdrawal, and to mitigate its consequences if it should materialize.

A.

Alliance Politics and the “Security Dilemma”
The “alliance security dilemma” was comprehensively outlined by Glenn Snyder

in 1984.95 Alliance politics, in all phases and strategic environments, essentially involves
balancing a state‟s policy between the dilemma‟s opposing horns: cohesion with and
support for allies, at the risk of compromising its own interests; and divergence from
them, at the risk of isolation.96 For NATO, the dilemma expresses itself in terms of a
95
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dichotomy between the European powers and the U.S. as hegemonic leader. If smaller
states support the dominant ally, they may be “entrapped” in its blunders, or in pursuit of
priorities they do not share; if they withhold support, or adopt alternative policies, the
unipolar power may abandon them: deny them, then or later, to lesser or greater extent,
its aid and support.97 The choices, and their results, tend to mirror the alternatives;98
measures to manage one horn of the dilemma tend to aggravate the other. Strong
commitment, to dissuade an ally from abandonment, reduces a state‟s influence, and
increases its exposure to entrapment.99 Weakening commitment or withholding support
may avert entrapment,100 but at the expense of increased abandonment risk.
Abandonment and entrapment presuppose differences, in substance or degree,
between the interests of allied states.101 Thus a key variable in the alliance dilemma is
the degree to which allies share interests potentially in jeopardy.102 Another factor is
mutual dependence; a function of each ally‟s strength and degree of conflict with an
adversary. An alliance is “a continuous bargaining process,”103 and the party that least
needs its allies‟ support holds greatest leverage over them. Entrapment occurs when a
state cooperates with an ally for the sake of an alliance it values more than the expected
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cost of cooperation; hence dependence on an ally magnifies entrapment risk.104 A less
dependent state, meanwhile, will be readier to resist others‟ preferences and to assert its
own.105 Dependence obviously bears also on the potential costs of abandonment.106
A more general factor driving the severity of entrapment and abandonment risks
is the character of the interstate strategic system itself. In a “multipolar” environment,
such as 1914 Europe, there are a several leading powers; none preeminent, each with
interests more or less compatible or conflicting with those of potential allies and foes.
Alliances are unstable, abandonment an omnipresent prospect, because mutual
dependence coexists with multiple realignment options.107 After 1945, a “bipolar”
system emerged: two opposing political-military blocs, each led by a predominant
power, formed the poles of a stable strategic confrontation, whose ultimate prize was the
freedom or domination of Europe. Entrenched antipathy, based largely on antithetical
political and economic systems, severely restricted realignment options and hence the
risk of abandonment.108 Since abandonment was so unlikely, a reluctant ally could avoid
entrapment simply by disassociation from -- could even try to restrain -- another state‟s
policy, with little fear of the latter‟s defection.109 Disagreements between the U.S. and
European allies in the 1970s,110 for example, did not herald the collapse of NATO but
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rather persisted within it, “precisely because the alliance cannot break up.”111 But this,
Europeans suspect, is no longer the case.

B.

Alliance Security Dilemma in a Unipolar System
The balance of dependence in an alliance, and the degree of policy divergence

among allies, are variable over time, influenced for example by changes in the security
environment or by perceptions of individual states.112 Transition from one systemic
structure to another produces tectonic shifts in alliance dynamics. The end of the Cold
War, and the emergence of a unipolar strategic environment, have had profound effects
on NATO through changes in the pattern of mutual dependence among the Allies, and in
the divergence of priorities, and even the devices, of policy. A key consequence has been
an aggravated potential for abandonment of the European Allies by the preeminent U.S.
(1).

Diminished Systemic Pressure for Cohesion

One crucial implication of the shift to a unipolar strategic system is that the U.S.
has far less need to maintain formal alliances such as NATO.113 Western Europeans‟
reliance on NATO is itself presumably less urgent than in the days when the Red Army‟s
legions faced westward a few hundred (or dozen) miles away, yet even for low-end
problems such as the Balkans crises, they have leaned heavily on American capacity for
decision and action. The U.S. need for NATO is, by contrast, far less exigent.
Since World War II, the U.S. has received little affirmative assistance from
European Allies (except the U.K.) in dealing with strategic problems outside Europe.
Today it expects little of Europeans, beyond preservation of a general peace on the
111
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Continent.114 Loss of Europe to Soviet subversion or assault would have produced a
dangerous shift in global power, but that sort of threat is no longer on the horizon.115 The
lesser tasks lately taken up by NATO – Balkan stabilization, democratization of Eastern
Europe -- have been intrinsically more important to Europeans, by reason of their
proximity to the hazards involved; their disproportionate reliance on U.S. capabilities to
address these regional problems undermines American fidelity to the Alliance.116
NATO‟s relatively lower importance to the U.S. is itself a reason for Europeans to
apprehend a danger of abandonment;117 not, perhaps, in the form of actual denunciation
of the North Atlantic Treaty, but more likely in diminished American attention and
support for European interests on regional security problems.118
(2).

Strategic Divergence

Divergence of strategic interests is a prerequisite for both entrapment and
abandonment. As Galia Press-Barnathan has explained, in the unipolar environment, not
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only is alliance cohesion weaker than under Cold War bipolarity, but policy divergence is
more pronounced.119 The perception of threats, and identification of problems requiring
action, differ between the hegemonic leader and the smaller allies.120 Above all, the
unipolar power has global strategic capabilities and concerns, while the weaker states are
disposed to concentrate on nearby, “regional” problems.121 So predicts Kagan‟s
capabilities thesis: possessing the preeminent means for global action, the U.S. is
inclined to undertake it; the Western Europeans, lacking the means to act globally, prefer
to act (and so also to think) locally.
This was largely true during the Cold War, too. But Europe is no longer the
cockpit of global confrontation, the chief focal point of U.S. strategic interest. Without
the unifying Soviet threat,122 it has become a region of comparative “strategic calm.”123
Under these favorable circumstances, contrasts between U.S. cosmopolitanism and
European parochialism are more pronounced, and more consequential for Alliance
relations. Inevitably the U.S. will devote relatively more attention, effort and resources
to its commitments elsewhere in the world, where peace has not conspicuously broken
out; and relatively time and energy less to Europe.124
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September 2001 only accelerated strategic divergence. The first major foreign
attack on U.S. home territory in over 185 years was a watershed. The response (cast in
even sharper relief by the torpor or, if you like, restraint of Clinton-era defense policy)
brought into dramatic effect the American disposition for military activism and for
unilateralism, with little deference to European sensibilities.125 Meanwhile the effect on
European threat perception and policy was quite limited;126 the net result, a further
widening of the transatlantic gap in strategic perceptions and priorities.127 European
irresolution, exhibited during the Kosovo episode, had already become a spur to
American unilateralism.128 In preparing for serious overseas operations, doubt about the
military value offered by most European Allies (and the political motives plainly visible
in their offer129) strongly favored U.S. selectivity in the framing of a working coalition.130
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(3).

European Interests Defined by Proximity, and Nearsightedness

For the U.S., Europe is no longer the lodestar of strategic policy. In contrast, as
one commentator put it, “Europe‟s priority is Europe.”131 In a unipolar environment,
with global public security largely outsourced to the hegemonic ally, the smaller powers
regard security problems in their immediate neighborhood with far more interest, and
devote far more attention and energy to them, than problems and threats “of a broader
strategic, world-order nature,”132 about which they can do relatively little. European
interest is fixed chiefly upon regional matters.133 The sharp difference in American and
European policy on Islamist terrorism is but one example.134 Another illustration is the
Western European bias for deployments within the European Continent and region -- in
the Balkans, and more recently (on a smaller scale) in Lebanon -- rather than in arguably
more important or volatile zones of conflict.
The widening transatlantic gap in strategic focus is compounded by the European
emphasis on “soft power” and multilateralism. These preferences are largely the
consequences not of superior wisdom but of inferior military capability; they are
probably best suited in any case to the unique political conditions of contemporary
Europe, and have limited application abroad.135 As one observer remarks, if American
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thinking assumes conflict inevitability, self-congratulation about Europe‟s transcendence
of power rests on “conflict myopia.”136

C.

Management of Alliance Risks in Post-Cold War NATO
Under conditions of unipolarity, then, the alliance dilemma is aggravated for the

Western European Allies,137 especially through increased risk of abandonment by the
U.S. The transatlantic divergence in strategic priorities -- intensified by a global U.S.
campaign against Islamist terrorism, its sponsors, and other dangerous states -- would
ineluctably dilute American attention to European security.138 Indeed it was no longer
impossible that, in reaction to strategic fatigue or overstretch, the U.S. might disengage
from Europe, retreating into “homeland sanctuarization” and hemispheric protection at
the expense of overseas commitments.139
Yet the European members continue to value the Alliance, as an organization
expressly devoted to European security, and a means of mitigating strategic uncertainties
linked with the shift to unipolarity.140 NATO still responds also to an older uncertainty,
one obscured by integration‟s rank efflorescence: the risk of conflict among the Western
Europeans themselves (discussed in detail below). While external threats have receded
and shrunk, NATO remains a hedge against risk, including emergence of new, or

2003): 121-136, at pp. 126, 128-129. Online. ProQuest Research Library. http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/
login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=392064521&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientId=4463&RQT=309&
VName=PQD. Accessed on 10 January 2009.
136
Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno?” p. 802.
137
Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” p. 282.
138
Ibid., pp. 298, 307. See also Press-Barnathan, “The Changing Incentives for Security
Regionalization,” p. 294.
139
Heisbourg, “US-European Relations,” p. 121.
140
Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” p. 308.

40

renewed, threats.141 Alliance with the powerful U.S. has also afforded Europeans
opportunities to “pass the buck” on matters of concern, if not of vital importance.142
Continuing interest in the maintenance of the Alliance requires Europeans to find
means of managing both horns of the dilemma, one of which at least – abandonment – is
aggravated by unipolarity. Press-Barnathan argues that to this end they have adopted two
general strategies: for entrapment, they have sought to use NATO as a “pact of restraint”
upon the U.S.; and to mitigate the threat of abandonment, they have pursued a “division
of labor” with the U.S.143
(1).

“Pact of Restraint” Strategy

An alliance serves not only to organize capabilities against threats, but also to
manage relations among members. States concerned about domination by a powerful
leader may attempt to use their alliance as a “pact of restraint,” a vehicle for influence
through a bargaining process in which they threaten to withhold aid and support, or
otherwise to penalize actions they disapprove.144 Bargaining position may be enhanced
by coordination among the smaller powers,145 but the key is their strategic capability:
bargaining power varies inversely with alliance dependence, directly with ability to
withhold from the superpower something it needs.146
In point of fact, Western Europeans have little real difficulty with entrapment, if
this means the danger of being dragooned into unwilling support for the aims of a
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hegemonic ally. It is far from evident that European states move in lockstep with U.S.
strategic policy – on military sales to China, on Iran‟s nuclear program, on missile
defense, on Turkish EU candidacy, on defense spending, or on military modernization. If
the opposition of France and Germany did not deter U.S. action in Iraq, neither were they
dragged involuntarily to war; nor were Spanish and Italian withdrawal penalized.147 By
contrast, British support for U.S. policy was grounded in a congruent assessment of the
Iraqi threat148 -- which by definition vitiates entrapment.
If dependence on the U.S. does not noticeably subject the European Allies to
entrapment in policies they disapprove, this may be because their measures against the
danger of abandonment are felt to be effectual.
(2).

“Division of Labor” Strategy

Post-Cold War divergence of threat perception and strategic priorities is
constituted, on the European side, by a preference for problems in and near Europe, while
the U.S. is diverted by commitments and challenges elsewhere. The concomitant danger
is that the hegemonic power will not devote the desired energy and resources to
management of European regional problems. This points directly to the means to
mitigate the danger of abandonment: “regional capabilities to deal with regional security
threats,” which Press-Barnathan terms a “division of labor” strategy.149
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Regional strategic capabilities respond to abandonment in two distinct ways.
First, they may reduce its probabilistic risk -- the likelihood of its occurrence. If the U.S.
values regionally capable European forces for its own purposes, it has a reason to
maintain Alliance commitments;150 or, more to the point, if excessive military weakness
within Europe might promote U.S. withdrawal, then preservation of defensive capability
helps avert that result.
Second, if abandonment should occur, regional capabilities reduce its potential
impact on Europeans. The danger pertains, above all, to those security problems that, by
reason of proximity, and disproportionately regional consequences, are of more concern
to Europeans than to the global superpower. Military forces able to handle these
problems, in the hands of Europeans themselves, reduce their dependence on the U.S.,
and take much of the sting out of the prospect of abandonment.151
(3).

“Division of Labor” in Practice via ESDP

Press-Barnathan‟s analysis emphasizes a collaborative approach to the division of
labor, through institutional policy integration in the ESDP.152 As she demonstrates, a
lead motive for creating a strategic policy mechanism under the EU aegis was to manage
the potential cost of abandonment. The idea of a common EU foreign and security
policy, anticipated in the early 1990s, gained impetus with the experience of the Balkan
wars.153 European interests, far more than American, were implicated; yet the European
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response was marked by “ineptitude.”154 The political circumstances of U.S. intervention
in Bosnia and Kosovo cast doubt on prospects for similar action in the future, feeding
new concern over abandonment,155 and prompting new convergence among European
powers in favor of independent EU capability.156 Hence the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty‟s
enhanced policy mechanisms, and the Helsinki Conference‟s “headline goals” for
military assets.157 Its framers intended ESDP to serve as a vehicle to assemble European
coalitions of the willing, to back EU policies with military options where U.S. interests
were not engaged.158 It was to be the institutional and collaborative embodiment of a
division-of-labor strategy, reducing potential abandonment costs through autonomous
capabilities to meet regional problems.
Yet ESDP remains underweight, in relation to Europe‟s security requirements,
and to the consequences of abandonment. Only very limited forces are at the EU‟s
disposal, and only for low-intensity operations: it can at present field, on short notice,
only two “battlegroups” of 1500-2200 troops, for crisis management and similar duties.
It undertakes no guarantee of members‟ independence and territorial integrity, and it has
no mechanism for organizing collective defense against major threats.159
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More fundamentally, ESDP‟s military capability is inherently potential and ad
hoc. Potential, since all forces and equipment earmarked to it remain under authority of
the contributing state, and may be withheld from any proposed operation.160 Ad hoc,161
because it omits any formal, binding ex ante commitment to military cooperation.162 Any
action requires a process of interstate consultation and coordination, aimed not only at
procuring unanimous consent, but also at assembling a “coalition of the willing” to
contribute the requisite military means. Hence ESDP is “perennially contingent.”163 The
uncertainties of the political effort in any discrete case164 imply a measure of policy risk
for EU members interested in the problem at hand. Even if consensus can be achieved,
the process would take time,165 impeding the prompt response often indispensable to
effective crisis management.166
The ESDP project is incomplete. It still exists primarily on paper,167 and its future
trajectory and velocity are uncertain.168 As a shield against abandonment, it remains a
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skeletal framework, with limited reach and impact. This is not to suggest that the effort is
wasted, or insincere. Yet EU members pursue it while maintaining large and wellestablished territorial defense armies under their own sovereign control.
What is indispensable to a division-of-labor policy is not institutional integration,
nor collaboration (necessary as it may be in a crisis), but “regional capabilities to deal
with regional security threats.” If European military power has limited global impact, in
its home region it is more significant. European national forces, indeed, constitute the
leading countermeasure against strategic abandonment by the U.S.
(4).

Maintenance of Territorial Defense Forces as Division-of-Labor Strategy

The motive elucidated by Press-Barnathan for pursuit of ESDP – as a means to
limit the effects of a potential U.S. abandonment of NATO – is even more persuasive in
explaining continuity in the individual states‟ force structures. Maintenance of large
militaries, under state control, primarily configured for territorial defense but also capable
of response to local and regional challenges, represents the most substantial (if less
acknowledged) means for the European Allies to deal with U.S. strategic neglect or
retrenchment. This policy serves in one respect to control the likelihood of abandonment,
in others to minimize its potential costs. It is wholly within state competency; it labors
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under no unanimity (or even multilateralism) rule; it supports national sovereignty
interests, and welfare-state priorities discussed below. Above all, it is functionally
congruent with the proximity-driven security concerns of European states.
(a).

European Land Armies Essential to Alliance Defense

The Allies‟ substantial territorial defense forces help limit the probability of
abandonment by the U.S. NATO‟s guarantee of European security has always rested on
two foundations: substantial European armies, to bear the brunt of initial resistance
against attack; and tangible assurance of a timely, effective transatlantic reinforcement by
the U.S. The latter would be difficult, even impossible, without the former: defeat in
Europe would leave nothing to reinforce, and nowhere to reinforce it. Were NATO
European military forces too far diminished, in size and defensive capability, the U.S.
reinforcement role would be rendered futile. Anticipatory realization of this futility
would likely spell the end of U.S. commitment to NATO -- an outcome avoided through
preservation of European defense forces at some level of perceived adequacy.
Throughout the Cold War, NATO‟s conventional forces in Europe, composed
predominantly of European armies, must manage the initial response to any crisis, while
preserving the threat of continued escalation.169 As the offshore maritime superpower,
the U.S. provided Europe with “crucial strategic depth.”170 Its forces stationed in Europe
would participate in the initial defense, but more importantly served to reassure friends,
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and to warn the enemy, that any attack would set in motion the full weight of U.S. power,
committed from the outset, if delayed in operational engagement.171
U.S. relief of an initial, mainly European, defense was and remains central to
NATO strategy against any major threat to Western Europe.172 Since the end of the Cold
War, conventional threats have diminished and retreated; they have not disappeared.173
There remains concern about Russia,174 not least because of the temptations presented for
Russian intervention by Eastern European instability.175 With a lower profile, NATO is
still the basis for European security against aggression, external or otherwise; its keystone
is still the U.S. as offshore strategic anchor, and guarantor against deterioration of the
strategic environment.176
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The U.S. guarantee rests on its promise of transatlantic intervention in case of
attack.177 Without significant European defensive power, however, this promise would
be eviscerated. As one commentator has said of defense in Northern Europe: “If the
Nordic countries want help from other countries including NATO members, they must be
able to hold off the enemy at least long enough for that help to arrive.”178 This was and is
true for all of NATO Europe. Its task at the outset of major conflict is to mobilize
sufficient forces, including large reserve elements, to resist attack and to hold key
territory until arrival of the relief.179 Should Europe fail in this, intervention by follow-on
U.S. forces would be problematic at best. U.S. deployment would require a broad
logistical bridgehead – ports, road and rail links, large-volume airfields. Effective
counter-offensive by maneuver would require retention of large portions of the mainland
north of the Alps. Without these, American intervention might be not just difficult,
costly, and delayed; it might prove impossible or ultimately futile.
Excessive reduction of Western European defense capabilities would make this
futility a real risk for the U.S.; no conceivable European policy would be more likely to
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provoke U.S. abrogation of the mutual defense guarantee -- or at least a withdrawal of
American forces, that would make intervention both more difficult and more optional.180
To avoid this, European NATO states must maintain armed forces at levels not obviously
inadequate, in light of current and potential near-term conditions, for a serious initial
defensive effort.181
(b).

Territorial Defense Forces for Local and Regional Security

European defense forces are essential, then, to limit the chance that abandonment
will occur. Through the functions they would assume in the event of U.S. abandonment,
the same forces also limit its potential costs. Abandonment cost mitigation requires a
state to possess or assemble the means to provide for its own security requirements,
without reliance on the possibly wayward ally. For European NATO states, the critical
requirement is for “regional capabilities . . . to deal with regional security threats.”182
Each has at hand an instrument of long-standing substance, under its exclusive
authority,183 suited to local and regional action: its own sovereign military forces.
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European armies in general still adhere to a territorial defense configuration.184
Capable of occasional small-scale “over-the-horizon” peacekeeping and similar actions,
they cannot conduct major independent deployments to remote combat theaters.185 In the
Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions, their effectiveness rested on geographical
proximity; in effect, they are tethered to Europe and its immediate periphery.186
As this implies, proximity magnifies capability. Europe‟s sealift shortage is
mitigated by territorial contiguity (except in parts of the periphery); regional air transport
would require fewer aircraft than inter-continental operations, since distances and
turnaround times are far shorter. Territorial defense force structures, emphasizing
manpower, armor, and interceptor and strike aircraft, would support a broad spectrum of
interventions within the European region, including combat operations187 against the full
range of potential adversaries.188 Regional non-combat operations likewise suit the
manpower-intensive European armies. Peacekeeping and crisis response demand boots
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on the ground more than firepower -- labor for emergency relief work, a large and visible
armed presence for security.189 Such operations, moreover, may entail prolonged
engagement, likewise placing a premium on troop strength for deployment rotations.190
The national forces of Western Europe enjoy a crucial advantage over ESDP‟s
military arm, in that they exist: they are not ad hoc and contingent, but have established
institutional being, stand in clearly defined relation to civilian authority, are woven into
the political and economic fabric of states, and retain considerable physical substance in
peacetime. Nor are the national armies subject to ESDP‟s limitations of scale and scope;
the EU‟s nominal 13 battlegroups would be brought to full complement by less than 2.5
percent of Western European NATO active-duty manpower. And the states hold sole
command authority over their armies: with the exception of Germany, in case of need
they can undertake military action without an intergovernmental political or coalitionbuilding process. With or without EU consensus, the several states‟ forces form the real
basis for action, in coalition or otherwise, to address regional security problems.
Two qualifications are appropriate. First, European emphasis on territorial
defense is not wholly exclusive. It is compatible with limited expeditionary capabilities,
and occasional, limited multilateral actions beyond the European region; for example, the
deployment of small contingents by several Continental states to Afghanistan and Iraq.191
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Second, European capabilities even for territorial defense and regional security are
limited. Yet even at low levels, they suffice for abandonment mitigation, under
contemporary conditions – with NATO, and with the U.S. commitment still anchored by
forces on the Continent. Were the U.S. to withdraw its forces or to abrogate the North
Atlantic Treaty, a commensurate increase in European defense spending and regional
military capabilities would be likely, if not inevitable.
To the extent capable of national self-defense, and of action to maintain stability
in and about the Continent, European NATO states avoid a hazardous dependence on
Americans for vindication of their most immediate and accepted strategic interests. By
the same means, they protect themselves against the effects of strategic abandonment by
the U.S. -- whether in abstention from specific action, or generalized inattention to
European interests, or a wholesale transatlantic re-embarkation. Maintenance of
Europe‟s long-standing territorial defense armies thus serves a division-of-labor strategy.
Further, by reducing the potential impact of abandonment, these forces limit the
threat of entrapment in U.S. policy. The more they can dispense with U.S. assistance in
addressing their leading priorities, the more readily Europeans can refuse to conform to
American preferences. The efficacy of this strategy is suggested by the exceptionally
limited gravitational pull of U.S. policy on the Western European Allies.
In sum, NATO Europe maintains seemingly anachronistic force structures for the
primary military purpose192 of limiting the prospective ill effects of strategic neglect or
retrenchment by the U.S. Among other evidence for this is the widely recognized –
though, in capability, far less substantial -- pursuit of ESDP to the same end. National
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territorial defense armies remain the essential means to survive both the possible decline
of NATO, and the possible deadlock or breakdown of ESDP.
(c).

European Armies Essential to Stability in a Post-NATO Europe

In the event of radical strategic abandonment by the U.S. -- withdrawal from
NATO, or withdrawal of American forces from Europe -- Western Europeans must
defend against external aggression and manage regional security problems. They would
also have to resume full responsibility, without external support, for the preservation of
peace within Europe, among themselves.
(i).

Internal Stabilization Role of the Alliance

NATO‟s initial impetus, and most obvious Cold War function, was to organize
members‟ military capabilities for effective deterrence and defense against Soviet power
(itself a sustaining influence for NATO cohesion).193 Yet even in the bipolar era this was
not all. NATO also imposed peace among the European Allies and facilitated a
reordering, without modern precedent, of the relations among them. The mutual defense
commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,194 and the American promise of
intervention, were not limited to “external” threats. They applied implicitly also to
aggression by any member against another. As the framework for “structural peace” in
Europe,195 NATO essentially eliminated the risk of war among the Allies.196
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Sheltered against the hazards that feed mutual distrust, the European states could
pursue cooperative relations. As John Mearsheimer explained, NATO‟s security
guarantee mitigated relative-gains concerns among Allies (“who will gain more?”),197
thereby greatly expanding the potential range of interstate collaboration. NATO enabled
members to abandon (at least suspend) strategic rivalry; cemented their renunciation of
territorial grievances; and facilitated economic and political integration.198 It also solved
the “German problem,” framing a secure position at the heart of the Continent for a state
both intrinsically powerful and geographically vulnerable, without resumption of
militarized nationalism.199 The Alliance‟s combination of supports and constraints was
essential to a German reunification that neighbors might otherwise have found
threatening.200 And in Eastern Europe, keeping peace among neighbors (many with
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latent but enduring territorial and other disputes) has been a powerful motive for adhesion
to the Alliance.201 In short, NATO has solved the security problem in Europe.202
This is the core of its contemporary significance. François Heisbourg wrote in
1992 that “Western Europe has to guard against the risk of a return to „la géopolitique de
grand‟papa‟,” or old-style geopolitics -- a reversion to the national strategic policies, a
resumption of the contest for national power, that marked most of Europe‟s modern
history.203 The European states share a fundamental interest in averting such regression,
through maintenance of multilateral defense arrangements.204 With ESDP in an uncertain
infancy, NATO is the basis for defense collaboration.205 As a system of reassurance and
restraint through deterrence, NATO has prevented aggression among its members; as a
system of support through mutual assured defense, it has obviated a potentially
destabilizing renationalization of security.
In both respects, its efficacy is founded on U.S. participation. NATO formalizes,
embodies and “cements” the U.S. commitment to Western Europe.206 Western European
acceptance of security dependence on the U.S. was essential to the postwar European
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order,207 since the degree of cooperation achieved was possible only with the U.S. as
“ultimate arbiter” in the alliance system.208 Only the assurance of intra-European
peace209 and of each Ally‟s independence and territorial integrity, through the promise of
intervention against any aggressor, made by an offshore superpower stronger than any of
them (or indeed any coalition of them), could suffice to overcome their previously
endemic rivalry.210 Only under this strategic shelter could Western Europeans “pursue[]
their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics.”211
Yet beneath the public self-assurance of Europe‟s liberal internationalism lies a
dormant uncertainty. By themselves, Western Europeans have not been notably effective
in producing collective goods such as mutual defense or political unity, even in the
shadow of Soviet aggression.212 They have relied heavily on the U.S. as “the great
organizer”213 (as well as the preeminent bearer of public security burdens). The
uncertainty, then, is whether European integration and cooperation would have selfsustaining momentum in the absence of external support. If war in Western Europe is
today “unthinkable,” this is because the U.S., through NATO, has made it so. The
reluctance of European states to hand over to the EU any real authority over foreign and
207
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military policy suggests that political and economic integration remain the superstructure
-- are not the foundation -- of a durable European peace. Whether the widely advertised
European transcendence of power can stand on its own, without “insurance underwritten
by the United States,” remains therefore an open question.214
(ii).

U.S. Withdrawal and National Military Power

Were the U.S. to abandon NATO, this uncertainty would cease to be dormant;
indeed it would become an exigent policy challenge. Together with the necessity of
preparing for potential threats, it would tend to promote a remilitarization of national
policy215 and a renationalization of military policy in Western Europe. In particular,
withdrawal of the unipolar American power would remove the chief material barrier to
resumption of strategic competition among the Western European Allies themselves.
As Germany achieved reunification, a position from which it might also attain
Continental preeminence, France and Britain were in a gradual relative decline, and Italy
adrift under leftist (and other) governments.216 It is significant that Europeans, especially
French and Germans, are not fully confident in the “German problem‟s” permanent
resolution.217 Nor, without NATO, has Germany‟s French-and-Russian problem been
solved in any permanent sense. Under la géopolitique de grand’papa, German power
must suffice to protect it against a combination of hostile neighbors; that power would in
turn be a worry to others, who must “combine against it, as they have . . . before.”218
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No one would desire a reappearance in Europe of the multipolar strategic system
of 1914. Yet -- obscured as it may be by integration, by NATO defense, and by the
fashionable aspirations of liberal internationalism -- European security is nevertheless
“founded upon a balance of power”219 stabilized by U.S. preeminence. It is instructive to
observe, for example, the consistency with which French military strength has been held
closely in line with that of Germany, despite an appreciably smaller population and
GDP.220 So long as war between them is essentially impossible, this French policy
presumably serves to maintain a balance with the Berlin Republic in the hard-power basis
for political influence within Europe.
Thus, with the U.S. in position as anchor of European security. In case of
American withdrawal, one would expect a general and more pronounced trend toward
interest and investment in the devices of power. Even without resumption of nineteenthcentury power politics -- even with a stronger EU, perhaps as successor to NATO in
organizing a common defense -- armed forces under state control would assume greater
significance, as Europeans assumed plenary responsibility for the stability of their
Continent. Military capabilities would be vital resources in intra-European policy
formation, in the forging of bargains on common security problems. And if, on the other
hand, after withdrawal of the American deus ex machina221 a cooperative environment
should not prevail, tendencies to rearmament and renationalization would be still
stronger; for state power would then face urgent demands.
219
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These possibilities lie in an uncertain future. Meanwhile, the territorial defense
armies of Western Europe serve as a hedge for each state against instability in the wake
of a U.S. withdrawal, and as a basis for the exercise of influence in the negotiation of
each state‟s position in a post-NATO Europe.
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V.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY PRIORITIES
Faced with no proximate existential threat, enjoying general peace and order

among themselves, the Western European states‟ chief function – and their electorates‟
leading demand – is the provision of social welfare and other public benefits, and the
management of economic stability. This priority exerts its own influence on defense
spending and force structure.

A.

Primacy of Social Welfare, and Zero-Sum Game with Defense Spending
The priority for social welfare is deeply rooted in the postwar European order. To

deal with social and political tensions accompanying reconstruction, industrialization and
urbanization, and to manage challenges to the consolidation of political liberalism, the
Western European states adopted deliberate (and widely supported) policies of
redistribution and social spending.222 State provision of a wide array of benefits and
services is entrenched in public preferences: Europeans expect income supports,
restrictive labor policies, extensive unemployment insurance, free or subsidized health
care and university education, media, and transportation services.223 Indeed, the term
“welfare state” was coined to describe the predominant role of modern European
government224 -- socio-economic and quality-of-life guarantees for constituents.225
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Data on European public spending are illustrative. Among EU members in 2004,
70 percent of state expenditures went to public benefit programs such as education,
health, housing, recreation and culture, and “social protection”226 – functions that (unlike
road-building, law enforcement, and defense) involve neither public goods nor collective
action problems, but are essentially redistributive. Among Western European NATO
states, public spending (net of defense) in 2006 ranged between a low 37.2 and a high of
51 percent of GDP, with most values in the mid and upper 40‟s.227
In the near term, state spending is largely a zero-sum game between mutually
exclusive priorities. Expenditure of public resources on defense means withholding them
from other, more popular purposes. One implication of the dominant welfare priority is
that, since the end of the Cold War, the Western European Allies have consistently fallen
short of U.S. defense spending as a percentage of GDP.228 Only the U.K. and France
have exceeded two-thirds the U.S. level in even part of this period; and almost across the
board European defense spending has been in decline.
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4.0
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1.3
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1.5
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2.2
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1.4
2.0
1.2
1.5
1.2
1.5
1.9
1.6
00-04 3.4
2.3
2.5
1.4
2.0
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.5
1.9
1.7
95-99 3.3
2.7
2.9
1.6
1.9
1.3
1.8
1.5
1.7
2.2
2.1
90-94 4.6
3.7
3.3
2.1
2.0
1.6
2.3
1.9
1.9
2.8
2.4
Germany, the largest economy in Europe, is among the most parsimonious with its military. Further,
“defense” expenditures as calculated by NATO for France, Italy (up to 2007) and Spain are overstated by
inclusion of outlays for their large paramilitary police organizations (103,000 Gendarmerie; 107,000
Carabinieri; and 73,000 Guardia Civil). See The Military Balance 2009, p. 447.
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The disfavored position of defense spending is reinforced by two other factors:
the absence of a publicly appreciated strategic exigency; and the availability of public
security goods provided and paid for by others. Under these conditions, asking voters to
forego public benefits in favor of defense entails a task of persuasion beyond the reach of
most politicians. Governments responsible to electorates predictably favor domestic
priorities,229 and without a visible near-term threat, a significant shift toward military
spending is politically improbable.230
The zero-sum game, with the deck stacked against the military, has been a longstanding constraint on European power. In the 1980s the European Allies, faced with
possible U.S. redeployment in case of a Persian Gulf contingency, recognized the need,
and even promised, to build up their logistics capabilities and reserve forces. Subsequent
“inability” to perform this undertaking is attributed to the non-negotiable welfare
priority.231 More recently, refusal to increase military spending at the expense of welfare
programs has impeded force modernization programs.232
The preference for welfare, however, also influences the allocation of funds
within defense budgets. Without imminent war-fighting needs, elements of military
spending perceived to advance welfare priorities attain a favored position.

229

Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate,” p. 570. See also Keir Lieber and Gerard
Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no. 1
(Summer 2005): 109-139, at p. 120. Online. Military & Government Collection. http://libdb.sjfc.edu:
2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=18213166&site=ehostlive&scope=site. Accessed on 2 April 2007 (“welfare state commitments” are a “self-imposed” constraint
on defense spending).
230
Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate,” p. 577. See also Meiers, “The Reform of the
Bundeswehr,” p. 19 (in Germany, “[t]he political reality . . . is that the defense budget has no constituency
in the government and public” [emphasis added]).
231
Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior,” pp. 341-342, 343.
232
Russell, “NATO‟s European Members – Partners or Dependents?” p. 32.

63

B.

European Socio-Economic Priorities Reflected in Military Spending and
Force Structure
(1).

European Military Spending is Biased Toward Personnel Expenditures

Welfare-state influence on defense budgets favors certain forms of spending, and
thereby influences force structure itself. Specifically, it promotes a continued priority for
manpower, or “consumption” spending, over “investment” in weapons, technology, and
logistical assets.233
Cold War conventional defense required manpower, in the form of large conscript
armies based almost entirely on home territory – a necessity that constrained the
investment components of defense spending. The Continental Allies have maintained
this pattern since the end of the Cold War,234 as shown by NATO data for members‟
defense spending allocations, including the proportion for “personnel”235 (see Appendix
B, p. 6). In 1990-1994, the U.S. averaged 39.3 percent, joining the U.K (42.2 percent)
and Norway (40.6) at the low end. The Continental states (with no data for France236)
applied substantially greater proportions of defense funds to manpower:
‟90-‟94
Percent:

Ger.
57.4

Italy
63.6

Spain Neth. Bel.
64.9 56.9 68.3

Den.
57.5

Port.
77.3

2008 NATO estimates show the U.S. percentage down to 29.9, with the U.K. (40.7
percent) and Norway (42.2 percent) next. Other European states significantly prefer
personnel spending:
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2008 Fr.
%(est) 56.9

Ger.
53.6

Italy
73.5

Spain Neth. Bel.
53.7 50.9 72.5

Den.
49

Port.
71.7

Against the contrary U.S. trend, and with the reduced physical scale of European armies
since the mid-1990s, the persistent tendency is striking.237
This bias, together with the gap in spending as a share of GDP, has magnified the
transatlantic capabilities divergence. Then-Defense Secretary William Cohen remarked
in 2000 that European NATO states “spend roughly 60 per cent of what the United States
does, and they get about 10 per cent of the capability.”238 Allowing something for
hyperbole, and something for the metrics of “capability,” the point is beyond dispute that
military power is not the sole object of European military spending. Force structures for
territorial defense and regional action do serve the primarily local security priorities of
NATO Europe. At the same time, these force structures are under strong influence from
the political consensus favoring social welfare, an influence independent of strategic and
security considerations.
(2).

European Militaries as Providers of Employment and Public Benefits

Threat management is not the sole “functional imperative” of armed forces; they
can also serve significant domestic socio-political purposes.239 The symbolism of
sovereignty is one. Otherwise, in Western Europe, non-strategic functions are limited,240
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de Nevers, “NATO‟s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era,” p. 60.
Tonelson, “NATO Burden-Sharing,” p. 52.
239
Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For?” p. 1073.
240
Western European forces‟ “socio-political” roles do not involve state-building (these countries are
mature and stable democracies), nor nation-building (where it exists, conscription is not universal, and
armies are no longer “schools of the nation”); nor do they undertake significant routine part in domestic
security or emergency response -- let alone act as praetorian supervisors of domestic politics. In contrast,
armed forces in Eastern Europe and elsewhere may perform a wider range of socio-political functions.
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with one exception: armed forces are a major “parallel or substitute provider of state
goods,” including public employment and associated benefits.241
(a). Military Employment -- Uniformed Personnel
A large military payroll affords both a supplement and an alternative to the
private sector, and to civilian public-sector employment. Armed forces serve, in part, as
employment programs – to keep participants occupied in a publicly accepted function,
while providing them a stable income. European states hence often prefer to maintain
active-duty personnel on the payroll, rather than to divert limited funds to modernization
or acquisition programs.242
Employment maintenance, if not necessarily inconsistent with military needs, is
autonomous of them. Its significance as a policy motive is illustrated, moreover, by other
personnel practices, common in Western Europe, that do compromise military
requirements. For example, in some states, military pay is tied directly to the salary
regime for civilian public-sector workers, with a deeply ingrained priority for “equity”
between them.243 Since civilian state employees are typically under the authority of
powerful unions, the equity principle limits the responsiveness of military payroll244 to
functional considerations peculiar to the armed services, such as retention rates, training
and expertise, and deployment experience; or, for that matter, physical capability.
Many members of the Western European armed forces are represented by labor
associations that approximate trade unions.245 Even those not quasi-unionized generally
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Ibid., p. 52 (in Germany, for example, this “comparability” is so far accepted that military personnel
“often call themselves „bureaucrats in uniform‟”).
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enjoy the same highly restrictive employment protections applicable to the private sector,
with the result that many professional soldiers “expect to serve for a lifetime, whether or
not the services need them.”246 Employee protections, together with generous military
pension plans, have favored retention of older personnel, and impeded recruitment of the
young.247 After force reductions in the mid-1990‟s, for example, the Belgian Army was
notable for forty-seven-year-old corporals and an average service duration of thirty-eight
years -- neither especially favoring combat readiness.248
As Williams remarks, “what sounds to a Western European like reasonable equity
and career stability can sound to an American like a jobs program.”249 Indeed it does.
(b). Military Employment of Civilians
The employment function of the military is illustrated also by the significant
contingents of non-combatant civilian staff maintained by most Western European armed
forces. According to figures published in early 2008, the French Defense Ministry had
approximately 79,000 civilian employees (for about 250,000 active-duty military
personnel); Germany, about 117,000 (as of 2006, with active-duty forces then about
284,000); Italy, roughly 35,000 (for about 185,000); and Portugal, nearly 10,000 (for
43,000).250 A British Defence Ministry report of 2009 cites roughly 76,000 full-time
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Ibid., p. 49 (emphasis added). A related, if emerging, phenomenon is the assertion of a “right” to
military service, demanding accommodation of homosexuality and even physical disability. Anthony
Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 103 et seq.
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Ibid., p. 45.
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Ibid., p. 45.
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Ibid., p. 57.
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“Europe,” Military Technology 32, no. 1 (January 2008): 110-238, at pp. 114, 125, 133, 146, 168,
182-184, 192-193, and 233. Online. Academic Search Complete. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?
vid=6&hid=107&sid=6f046b99-a5f8-4c42-936a-a583eff0baab%40sessionmgr110. Accessed on
26 October 2009. Relatively low civilian staff numbers are reported for the Netherlands (2000 for Air
Force and Navy, no data for Land Forces, but proportional complement would be about 1250, for a total of
3250 for 40,000 active-duty troops); and far lower for Denmark (560 civilians, 30,000 troops). Belgium
also has a relatively low ratio; roughly 2100 civilians for 38,000 troops as of late 2007. See “Note
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employees (exclusive of “locally engaged civilians” overseas).251
A problem encountered in German military reform efforts suggests the
implications of heavy civilian employment.252 A proposal floated in 2000 would have
closed roughly half of Germany‟s military installations and bases, to save funds and
improve military efficiency through facility consolidation.253 Expected effects on local
civilian employment,254 however, provoked significant opposition.255 Citing “local
economic and social factors,” the Defense Ministry scaled back the plan, ultimately to
reach fewer than ten percent of its facilities.256 The anecdote is not cited to suggest that
German policy is uniquely influenced by civilian employment interests: this is to be
suspected in any state that both possesses a large complement of civilian defense
employees, and largely refrains from the operational deployments that may necessitate
reliance on civilians for domestic support functions.257
(c). Military Compensation -- Overlap with Public Benefits
Military pay and benefits substitute for a portion of generally available civilian
welfare and unemployment programs that the state would otherwise provide. Indeed, the
overlap between them is so substantial that (in contrast to the U.S.) military recruiting in
d‟Orientation Politique, La Défense.” (Bruxelles: Ministère de la Defénse, Juin 2008): 1-66, at p. 31.
Online. http://www.mil.be/mod/index.asp?LAN=fr. Accessed on 26 October 2009.
No data are available for Norway or Spain; an educated guess would be that they tend in the
directions of Denmark and Portugal, respectively.
251
“Civilian Workforce Strategy 2009 – For a High Performing, Diverse Civil Service in Defence.”
(London: Ministry of Defence, 2008), p. 5. Online. http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BD6A422D-837B41C7-9F3D-7525F7F3B7CF/0/cws09_final.pdf. Accessed on 26 October 2009.
252
In 2000 the Bundeswehr possessed a civilian staff numbering approximately 140,000 – for about
338,000 military personnel. Meiers, “The Reform of the Bundeswehr,” p. 3.
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Meiers, “The Reform of the Bundeswehr,” p. 9.
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Ibid., p. 9 (citing effects in rural areas where Bundeswehr was a major employer). Another telling
objection to the plan was that active-duty conscripts ought to be able to serve near their homes.
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Longhurst, “Endeavors to Restructure the Bundeswehr,” p. 34.
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Meiers, “The Reform of the Bundeswehr,” p. 9.
257
It is advantageous for an expeditionary, war-fighting military to “outsource” as many of its service
and support functions as possible to civilians, so as to maximize the number of troops available for combat
duties. In such organizations, civilian service employees are force multipliers.
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Europe is typically not advantaged by deteriorating economic conditions and higher
unemployment.258 “Western European social safety nets [support] people who in the
United States would see military service as an alternative to unemployment. . . .”259
Among other typical benefits are policies favoring military families, including
subsidized housing, child care, and efforts to “reduce family separations.”260 Useful as
incentives for recruiting and retention, they also tend to encourage early marriage and
child-bearing. This may not always serve interests of military readiness,261 in terms of
individual soldier deployability, availability for training, morale and unit cohesion.
By way of a final example, German conscription policy offers alternatives to
military service, and thereby affords a significant side “benefit” for the state: a large
body of conscientious objectors provides inexpensive (if also unskilled) labor in support
of the social welfare system.262 Reluctance to forego this labor pool aided the successful
opposition to Defence Ministry conscription reform proposals.263

C.

Spending Priorities Favor Territorial Defense Force Structure
In the policies shaping contemporary European force structure and defense

budgets, military effectiveness is not the sole consideration. Public expectations and the
state‟s commitment to social welfare priorities weigh heavily in the allocation of defense
funds. Hence, among the military‟s practical functions is to provide stable employment,
258
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salaries, and benefits that, in part, substitute for other welfare-state programs. This is
evident in the marked preference among Western European militaries for expenditure on
personnel and “consumption,” rather than on arms, equipment and power projection
resources.
Meanwhile, the leading strategic concern for NATO‟s European members is to
prepare for potential abandonment by the U.S., whether in the form of abstention from
particular security problems or a generalized withdrawal. Limiting the potential damage
from such eventualities requires certain military capabilities: for territorial defense, to
preserve state sovereignty; and for regional action to manage those problems that, by
reason of proximity, implicate regional security. It does not require the means for global
strategic action.
At the confluence of these imperatives lies the contemporary European force
structure. It is a lineal descendant of its Cold War progenitor, albeit on a reduced scale;
heavily weighted toward manpower, and to the facilities, weapons and capabilities of
territorial defense; and, for the most part, incapable of action beyond the immediate
environs of Europe.
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VI.

CONCLUSION
I have argued that three significant strands of policy inform the continued

preference of the Western European NATO states for large territorial defense militaries.
Of the two elements falling within the broad category of strategic policy, the first is the
more general: that a state‟s independence rests ultimately on its ability to use force in
defense of its vital interests, or to contribute materially to common defense by a coalition.
The relationship is of such long standing that military power has become a symbol of
sovereignty. In a Europe at peace, the symbolism may seem more relevant than the
substance. But the makers of policy -- to whom all possible futures are perforce
uncertain -- are reluctant to relinquish the hard instruments of power that would be
needed to vindicate territorial integrity and political independence against armed threat.
This first factor is generic, bearing (presumably) upon the policy of almost any
state. By contrast, the alliance security dilemma pertains to members of a mutual defense
alliance; it is particularly important for the European members of post-Cold War NATO.
Strategic abandonment by the preeminent transatlantic Ally reentered the realm of
possibility with the end of the Cold War, with the emergence of the U.S. as a unipolar
power, and with the prevalence of peace in Europe. This danger demands measures both
to diminish its likelihood and to control its prospective consequences. To avert a U.S.
withdrawal premised on the futility of Alliance defense, the Western European Allies
must possess adequate defense forces. In case the U.S. should withdraw or, more likely,
decline to act on a regional problem, the Europeans must hold regional strategic
capabilities. Finally, a full U.S. withdrawal would end the offshore great-power
guarantee of European peace, and would test the resilience and momentum of European
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integration by removing a crucial barrier to resumption of competitive politics in Europe.
Whether in a self-sustaining and free-standing Union, or with its disintegration, European
states would need military power -- ultimately, to preserve their own independence. The
one policy that meets each of these demands is for states to maintain substantial military
forces, armed and organized principally for territorial defense.
The third factor, exogenous to strategic policy, nonetheless strongly influences it:
the primacy of welfare in the allocation of public resources. Spending on manpowerintensive territorial defense armies is congruent with the priorities, and complementary
with the programs, of the social welfare system. Alternative forms of expenditure,
especially on force modernization and power projection capabilities, are not.
These three positive policy influences contribute to the persistence in Western
Europe of force structures remarkably consistent with the Cold War model – built chiefly
for territorial defense, and substantially non-deployable.
There are also, however, what might be termed “negative” influences, in that they
tend to impede movement toward an alternative strategic orientation and force structure.
One is summed up in the exploitation thesis: that, with the unipolar superpower more or
less consistently providing the global public security goods that Western Europeans find
useful, there is little reason for them either to duplicate or to contribute to American
efforts beyond Europe. Further, the loss of almost all significant overseas possessions
dramatically reduced the state-specific “private” goods that, in a remote past, gave
European states reasons for strategic action abroad.
A second constraint is indicated by Kagan‟s “capabilities” thesis: that the gap in
military power between Europe and the U.S. has occasioned development of genuinely
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divergent ways of perceiving threats and of formulating responses to them. Europeans, in
general, are less disposed to use power, more inclined to the processes of collaboration
and integration that have so strikingly marked (recent) European history. Here, too, a
major cause is to be found in history: the destruction wrought by World War II, and the
weakened condition of Europe in its aftermath, from which American strategic dynamism
took an early and still unchallenged lead.
These changes in turn took root in political culture -- in widely held, if often
implicit, expectations conditioning the role and power of the state. Disproportionate U.S.
capability and activity; Europe‟s retreat from empire, and inability to undertake a major
overseas role in the containment of Communist aggression; absorption in the broadening
and deepening of European integration – all have contributed to strategic insularity as a
habit of thought and a way of life. Europe has not embraced a successor to empire as a
rationale for serious global engagement. Instead, much of its “modern history has been
spent adjusting to the notion” that it need not be concerned with “quarrels [among]
peoples of faraway countries about which Europeans know nothing. . . .”264
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Appendix A: Forces Deployed or Stationed Abroad
Global (excluding forces in W.E. NATO states) [troops abroad within W.E. NATO]
Numbers
1990 – 1991265
US
161,000
[308,000]
UK
22,000
[67,200]
Fr
32,000
[55,400]
Ger [naval detachment, Med.]
It
177
Sp
10,064
Ne
650
[5700]
Bel
0
[24,900]
Den 384
Nor 953
Port
0
1996 – 1997
US
150,000
UK
25,000
Fr
39,000
Ger 5100
It
2500
Sp
1700
Ne
3500
Bel
1240
Den
Nor 1650
Port 1250
2002 – 2003
US
148,000
UK
16,000
Fr
32,000
Ger 8500
It
6500
Sp
3050
Ne
4130
Bel
1475
Den 1210
Nor 1165
Port 1425
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[111,000]
[29,000]
[15,000]

[3400]
[2000]

% of A.D. Forces
7.6 %
7.2%
6.9%
[ ]
0.045
3.7
0.63
0
1.2
2.8
0

9.7
10.4
9.5
1.5
0.76
0.83
4.7
2.6

[ 14.5%]
[ 22% ]
[ 12.0% ]

[ 5.6% ]
[ 27.1% ]

[ 7.2 ]
[ 12.1 ]
[ 3.7 ]

[ 4.6 ]
[ 4.2 ]

5.5
2.3

[104,000]
[17,700]
[3000]
[93]
[2680]
[2000]

% of Depl. Forces in Balkans
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

16.3%
42.0
19.2
78.4
88.0
82.4
W.E. total
57.1
in Balkans:
99.1
37.8%
53.8
72

10.8
7.6
11.7
2.8
2.8
2.1
8.2
3.7
5.7
4.4
3.3

[ 7.6 ]
[ 8.4 ]
[ 1.1 ]
[ 0.04 ]
[ 5.3 ]
[ 5.1 ]

Excludes deployments for Persian Gulf War, noted infra.
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Excl. UK:
36%

5.4%
24.4
23.1
76.5
89.2
82.0 W.E. total
76.3 in Balkans:
84.5
41.0%
74.8 Excl. UK:
94.4
49.2%
45.0

Global (excl. W.E. NATO)
[troops stationed abroad within W.E. NATO]
Numbers
% of Active-Duty Forces
% of Depl. Forces in Balkans
2005 - 2006
US
UK
Fr
Ger
It
Sp
Ne
Bel
Den
Nor
Port

325,000
20,000
21,700
7200
9055
2700
2700
770
1375
368
800

[103,500]
[22,600]
[2800]
[450]
[91]
[2680]
[2000]

25.2%
9.7
8.5
2.5
4.7
1.8
5.8
2.1
6.5
1.4
1.8

[ 8.0% ]
[ 11.0 ]
[ 1.1 ]
[ 0.16 ]
[ 0.05 ]

16.0
12.2
10.0
2.6
4.1
2.0
6.2
3.3
3.8
2.9
1.6

[ 5.1 ]
[ 14.3 ]
[ 1.1 ]
[ 0.21 ]
[ 0.05 ]

[ 5.8 ]
[ 5.4 ]

0.89%
12.5
14.0
68.1
47.0
64.3
37.0
65.6
52.7
50.3
80.6

W.E. total
in Balkans:
29.2%
Excl. UK:
36.4%

0.62%
0.88
7.8
37.6
32.4
33.9
3.64
15.0
28.3
7.04
44.1

W.E. total
in Balkans:
13.25%
Excl. UK:
18.3%

2008
US
UK
Fr
Ger
It
Sp
Ne
Bel
Den
Nor
Port

246,224 [79,132]
19,594 [22,870]
24,852
[2800]
6354
[509]
7591
[91]
3025
2535
[300]
1269
1133
544
698

[ 0.73 ]

UNIFIL – U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Lebanon, 2008
Number
% of Deployed Troops
Fr.
2177
8.8%
Ger. 243
3.8%
It.
2420
31.8%
Sp.
1139
38.0
Bel. 485
37.3%
Port. 146
20.1%
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Major Operational Deployments
Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991266 -Deployments by NATO Members
U.S.
697,000 267
U.K.
45,400
France
14,600
Canada
2000
Italy
1200
Netherlands
600
Spain
500
Belgium
400
Greece
200
Denmark
100
Norway
50

Bosnia:
U.S.
U.K
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Turkey
Canada
Greece
Portugal
Denmark
Spain
Belgium
Norway

IFOR (1996) and
16,500
13,000
10,000
4000
2100
2000
1200
1000
1000
900
800
c. 700
300
100

Percentage of Active-Duty Forces
32.9%
14.8%
3.2%
0.31%
0.58%
0.18%
0.43%
0.32%
0.15%
SFOR (2000)268 -- NATO Member Contributions
4300
1100
2400
2050
1550
1000
1050
900
100
323
300
1100
50
50

266

Nationmaster.com. “Military Statistics – Gulf War Coalition Forces By Country.” Online.
Available: http://www.Nationmaster.com/graph/mil_gul_war_coa_for-military-gulf-war-coalition-forces.
Accessed on 26 February 2007.
267
Compare Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf
War,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Autumn 1991): 5-4, p. 25, n. 65. Online. JSTOR.
http://www.jstor.org/ stable/pdfplus/2539059.pdf. Accessed on 27 January 2007 (500,000 U.S. troops;
35,000 British; 10,000 French. Smaller figures may exclude rear support personnel in region but not in
Saudi Arabia or Kuwait).
268
UN-Authorized Implementation Force (IFOR), led by NATO, and UN-Authorized Stabilization
Force (SFOR) implemented by NATO from June 1998; data as of 4 March, 1996 and 28 June, 2000,
respectively. Steven R. Bowman, “Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service
Issue Brief for Congress, updated January 22, 2001; Comparative Bosnia-Herzegovina IFOR / SFOR
Deployments, pp. 7-9. Online. https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/844/
IB93056_20010122.pdf? sequence=1. Accessed on 10 April 2009.
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2000269
6100
5850
5600
4800
3500
1650
1300
1250
1230
1000
1000
900
800
330

KFOR, Kosovo
U.S.
Italy
Germany
France
U.K.
Netherlands
Canada
Norway
Spain
Belgium
Turkey
Denmark
Greece
Portugal
Afghanistan
UK
Fr
Ger
It
Sp
Ne
Bel
Den
Nor
Port
[ US
Iraq
UK
Fr
Ger
It
Sp
Ne
Bel
Den
Nor
Port
[ US

2008
1514
2210
2270
1830
173
13
30
639
195
311
258

2005
585
1265
1072
1246
525
153
250
190
147
8
18,000
2005
9200

-- NATO Member Contributions

2008 -- W.E. NATO Contributions
8330
3035
3310
2350
780
1776
497
750
457
70
31,700 ]
2008 -- W.E. NATO Contributions
4120

3100

72

1100

7

470
12
128
121,600

33
8
143,000 ]

269

As of 12 January 2000 (i.e., roughly half a year after the aerial campaign). U.K. Ministry of
Defence, “Kosovo: Current Deployments in Kosovo.” Online. Available: http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/
deploymnets.htm. Accessed on 26 February 2007.
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Fatalities, Coalition Forces (NATO Members)
Afghanistan, October 2001
to 22 September 2009270

Iraq, 19 March 2003
to 1 August 2009271

U.S.

812

4320

U.K.

217

179

[Canada]

131

Fr.

31

Ger.

33

It.

21

33

Sp.

25

11

Ne.

21

2

Bel.

1

Den.

25

Nor.

4

Port.

2

7

270

Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index” (Brookings Institution, 23 September
2009). Online. www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/˜/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index
/index20090923.pdf. Accessed on 31 October 2009.
271
Michael E. O‟Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, “Iraq Index” (Brookings Institution, 20 August 2009).
Online. www.brookings.edu/saban/˜/media/Files/Center/Saban/Iraq%20index/index20090820.pdf.
Accessed on 31 October 2009.
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Forces Stationed or Deployed Abroad
1968-69
1974-75

(within Western Europe / abroad)
1979-80
1984-85
1990-91

U.S.

277K / 73K

301 K / 194K 308 K / 161K

U.K.

67 K / 5.6 K

72 K / 20.7 K 67.2 K / 22 K

Fr.

36 K / 27.7K 51.2K / 38 K 55.4 K / 32 K

Ger.

0

0

naval det Med

It.

0

/ 130

/ 177

Sp.

/ 16 K

/ 16 K

/ 10 K

Ne.

5 K / 1400

5.5 K / 770

5.7 K / 650

Bel.

25 K /

25 K /

24.9 K /

Den.

/ 365

/ 341

/ 384

Nor.

/ 942

/ 838

/ 953

Port.

0

0

0

1996-97

2002-03

2005-06

2007

U.S.

111K / 150 K 104 K/ 148 K 103.5K /325 K

U.K.

29 K / 25 K

17.7 K / 16 K 22.6 K / 20 K

22,303 / 24,351
(I – 9500; A 6100)

Fr.

15 K / 39 K

3 K / 32 K

2.8 K / 21.7 K

2800 / 26,016
( Afgh. 1100)

Ger.

/ 5.1K

/ 8.5 K

450 / 7200

409 / 9071
(Afgh 2900)

It.

/ 2.5K

93 / 6.5 K

91 / 9055

91 / 6592
(I 50; Af 1300)

Sp.

/ 1.7K

/ 3050

/ 2700

/ 3400
(Afgh 625)
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90,422 / 271,771
(I – 165.7 K; Af – 12 K)

1996-97

2002-03

2005-06

2007

Ne.

3.4K / 3.5K

2680 / 4130

2680 / 2700

2600 / 2442
(I 15; Af 1889)

Bel.

2 K / 1240

2 K / 1475

2K / 770

/ 654 (I 160; Af 150)

Den.

??

1210

/ 1375

/ 1329 (I 442; Af 380)

Nor.

1650

1165

/ 368

/ 677 (I 12; Af 433)

Port.

/ 1250

/ 1425

/ 800

/ 823 (I 8; Af 166)
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Appendix B: Defense Spending, Personnel
Strength, and Power Projection Assets Compared
Rows represent:
(1). defense spending as a percentage of gross national (domestic) product.
(2). active-duty military personnel as a percentage of national population.
(3). ratio of the two proportions.
(4). total active duty forces (1000s).
(5). airlift aircraft (transport and tankers, etc.).
(a). ratio of airlift assets to personnel (thousands).
(6). sealift vessels (supply, logistical support, transport; excluding amphibious).
(a). ratio of sealift assets to personnel (thousands).
U.K.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

68-69 5.7
5.3
4.3
2.9
2.3
4.0
.769 1.00 .779 .689 .943 .858
7.41273 5.3
5.52 4.21 2.44 4.66
427
505
456
365
305
108.5
a/l
147
160
96
64
150
18
s/l
[ data inadequate for comparison274 ]

2.8
1.03
2.72
99
50

2.6
.94
2.77
45.5
16

4.0
.915
4.37
35
15

6.7
1.92
3.49
182.5
60

9.8
1.74272
5.63
3500
2590

74-75 4.9
3.1
2.9
2.9
1.9
.631 .966 .789 .764 .806
7.76 3.21 3.68 3.80 2.36
354.6 502.5 490
421
284
a/l
144
195
56
93
20 ?
s/l
[ data inadequate for comparison ]

3.3
.844
3.91
113.9
12

2.0
.915
2.19
89.7
32

1.9
.733
2.59
37.1
10

3.3
.873
3.78
34.9
12

4.7
2.36
1.99
217
65

6.2
1.02
6.08
2174
2348

79-80 4.7
.577
8.15
322.9
a/l
87
s/l
3

5.0
.917
5.45
2022
1784
c. 571

U.K.

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

3.3
.947
3.48
509.3
197
2

3.4
.804
4.23
495
97
19

2.4
.638
3.76
365
33
2

1.8
.860
2.09
321
89
2

3.3
.814
4.05
114.8
12
[?]

3.5
.867
4.04
86.8
25
2

2.4
.674
3.56
34.7
11
--

3.2
.954
3.35
39
14
1

2.8
.615
4.55
60.5
27
7

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

272

U.S. figures for manpower and spending, 1968-‟69, reflect peak of Vietnam War; other NATO states
were not then involved in significant military operations.
273
High spending-to-manpower ratio reflects early U.K. adoption of fully professionalized, hence
smaller, forces (1962), while maintaining substantial Royal Navy and strategic nuclear capability. The
most nearly comparable Continental power, France, had smaller Navy and retained conscription.
274
Figures in early editions The Military Balance do not adequately distinguish coastal and littoral
support vessels from ocean-going ships, and therefore do not facilitate power projection comparisons.
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U.K.

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

84-85 5.3
.581
9.12
325.9
a/l
95
s/l
20

4.2
.863
4.87
471.4
200
13

4.1
.806
5.09
495
82
31

2.6
.647
4.02
375.1
44
--

2.5
.857
2.92
330
81
2

3.3
.717
4.6
103.3
12
--

3.4
.945
3.60
93.6
24
2

2.5
.61
4.10
31.4
12
--

3.0
.887
3.38
36.8
13
1

3.4
.623
5.46
63.5
17
--

6.5
.902
7.21
2136
1905
[121 ]

90-91 4.16
.54
7.7
306
a/l
103
ratio .337
s/l
22
ratio .072

3.66
.818
4.47
461.2
141
.306
19
.041

2.8
.777
3.6
469
138
.294
21
.045

2.52
.68
3.71
389.6
44
.113
5
.013

2.08
.689
3.02
274.5
66
.24
3
.011

2.88
.694
4.15
102.6
12
.117
2
.019

2.54
.932
2.73
92
24
.261
2
.022

2.09
.623
3.35
31.7
6
.189
2
.063

3.3
.812
4.06
34.1
13
.381
0
---

3.13
.647
4.84
68
20
.294
2
.029

5.77
.851
6.78
2118
1853
.875
239
.113

96-97 3.1
.41
7.56
239.6
a/l
94
ratio .392
s/l
14
ratio .058

3.1
.700
4.43
409
146
.357
19
.046

2.0
.419
4.77
339.9
89
.262
18
.053

1.8
.568
3.17
328.7
58
.176
12
.037

1.5
.526
2.85
206
62
.301
8
.039

2.2
.479
4.59
74.4
7
.094
1
.013

1.7
.468
3.63
47.2
16
.339
2
.042

1.8
.634
2.84
33.1
5
.151
3
.091

2.6
.686
3.79
30
12
.4
0
---

2.9
.549
5.28
54.2
22
.406
1
.018

3.8
.582
6.53
1547
1745
1.128
256
.165

02-03 2.5
.365
6.85
211.4
a/l
82
ratio .388
s/l
16
ratio .076

2.6
.464
5.6
273.7
167
.61
7
.026

1.5
.376
3.99
308.4
90
.292
16
.052

2.0
.406
4.93
230.4
52
.226
7
.03

1.2
.366
3.28
143.5
48
.334
7
.049

1.7
.319
5.33
50.4
10
.198
3
.059

1.3
.387
3.36
39.4
18
.457
3
.076

1.5
.399
3.76
21.4
6
.28
2
.093

1.8
.601
3.0
26.7
9
.337
0
---

2.0
.439
4.56
43.6
22
.504
2
.046

3.2
.502
6.37
1368
2246
1.642
224
.164

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

U.K.
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U.K.

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

05-06 2.3
.34
6.76
205.9
a/l
91
ratio .442
s/l
20
ratio .097

2.0
.42
4.76
255
190
.745
5
.020

1.1
.346
3.18
284.5
98
.344
21
.074

1.04
.33
3.15
191.9
71
.37
11
.057

0.84
.364
2.31
147.3
99
.672
6
.041

1.64
.28
5.86
46.3
11
.238
3
.065

.93
.35
2.66
36.9
23
.623
2
.054

1.2
.386
3.11
21.2
6
.283
2
.094

1.74
.566
3.07
25.8
9
.349
0
---

1.27
.426
2.98
44.9
22
.49
1
0.22

3.89
.503
7.73
1291
2068
1.602
251
.194

„07

2.27
.315
7.21
191
a/l
110
ratio .58
s/l
18
ratio .094

1.56
.419
3.72
254.9
151
.59
5
.020

1.20
.298
4.03
245.7
96
.39
19
.077

.824
.329
2.50
191.1
33
.17
13
.068

.730
.365
2
147.3
96
.65
7
.048

1.46
.322
4.53
53.1
9
.17
3
.056

.847
.382
2.22
39.7
14
.35
9
.227

1.24
.396
3.13
21.6
6
.28
4
.185

1.47
.509
2.89
23.4
9
.38
0
---

1.25
.415
3.01
44
30
.68
1
.023

4.23
.505
8.38
1506
1907
1.27
216
.143

‟08
(1).
(2).
(3).
(4).

2.33
0.26
8.96
160

1.54
0.39
3.95
249

1.19
0.30
3.97
244

0.96
0.32
3.0
185

0.73
0.37
1.97
149

1.35
0.24
5.63
41

0.81
0.37
2.19
39

1.26
0.54
2.33
30

1.22
0.42
2.9
19

1.19
0.40
2.98
43

4.78
0.51
9.37
1539

U.K.

Fr.

Ger

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port. U.S.

(1). defense spending as a percentage of gross national (domestic) product.
(2). active-duty military personnel as a percentage of national population.
(3). ratio of the two proportions.
(4). total active duty forces (1000s)
(5). airlift aircraft (transport and tankers, etc.).
(a). ratio of airlift assets to personnel (thousands).
(6). sealift vessels (supply, logistical support, transport; excluding amphibious).
(a). ratio of sealift assets to personnel (thousands).

NOTES on DATA
PROXIES. Power projection proxy assets: airlift (“a/l”: transport and tanker) aircraft,
and sealift (“s/l”): logistical support, supply, cargo, transport) vessels. These are
indispensable to intercontinental operations on any substantial scale. The ratio of these
assets to manpower (1000s) indicates degree of the force‟s expeditionary capability.
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An alternative proxy to sealift might be amphibious ships and craft, capable of approach
to and landing on beaches under fire. This is a specialized subset of seaborne operations,
however, and as a proxy of deployability would tend to be narrow and under-inclusive.
Other proxy candidates would be less representative: aircraft carriers (predominantly
U.S., needed for maritime control and defense functions as well as power projection);
heavy bombers (solely U.S. since phasing-out of British strategic bomber force in early
1980s, but strongly associated with strategic nuclear role, as one element of nuclear
deterrent triad); fighter and ground attack aircraft (latter, in particular, probably
indispensable to power projection, but both also necessary for territorial defense);
armored vehicles – cannot be moved without heavy sealift capacity, and central to
territorial defense.
SPENDING RATIOS. A high ratio of defense expenditure to manpower can of course
result from a very low level of personnel; thus, only states with both relatively high
spending per GDP and a high spending / manpower ratio possess capital-intensive forces.

Public Spending as Percentage of GDP, 2006
U.S.

U.K.

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port.

Total 34.5

45.0

53.0

46.0

50.0

38.0

46.0

49.0

51.0

---

46.0

Net*

42.7

51.0

44.9

49.0

37.2

44.4

48.1

49.8

---

44.7

30.6

* excluding defense spending.
As of 2004, among the 27 EU member states, 70 percent of public spending was devoted
to what could broadly be termed welfare priorities: health care, education, recreation and
culture, housing, and “social protection.” Another 27 percent was for “general public
services,” “economic affairs,” law enforcement and public safety, and environmental
protection; the remaining three percent went to defense.
Source: Ulrike Mandl, Adriaan Dierx, and Fabienne Ilzkovitz, “European Economy:
The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Public Spending,” Economic Papers 301 (Brussels:
European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
February 2008): 1-36, pp. 10 - 11.
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*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Defense Spending, Percentage of GDP, Post-Cold War
Source: The Military Balance.

U.S.

U.K.

Fr.

Ger.

It.

Sp.

Ne.

Bel.

Den.

Nor.

Port.

2008 4.78

2.33

1.54

1.19

0.96

0.73

1.35

0.81

1.26

1.22

1.19

2007 4.23

2.27

1.56

1.20

.824

.730

1.46

.847

1.24

1.47

1.25

05-06 3.89

2.3

2.0

1.1

1.04

0.84

1.64

.93

1.2

1.74

1.27

02-03 3.2

2.5

2.6

1.5

2.0

1.2

1.7

1.3

1.5

1.8

2.0

96-97 3.8

3.1

3.1

2.0

1.8

1.5

2.2

1.7

1.8

2.6

2.9

90-91 5.77

4.16

3.66

2.8

2.52

2.08

2.88

2.54

2.09

3.3

3.13
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*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Spending on “Personnel” as Percentage of Total
Defense Expenditures. Source: NATO275 (before 2004, period averages
only.)

1990-1994

1995-1999

2000-2004

2004

2007 ____

US

39.3

39

36.1

34.4

31.8

UK

42.2

39.4

39.4

39.8

38.8

Fr.

-----

58.2

59.6

57.4

57.1

Ger.

57.4

61.5

60.0

59.3

54.9

It.

63.6

71.8

73.1

75.3

72.8

Sp.

64.9

66.5

58.2

53.9

53.0

Ne.

56.9

54.6

50.6

50.5

47.2

Bel.

68.3

69.3

70.4

73.6

78.9

Den.

57.5

59.8

52.8

53.4

50.6

Nor.

40.6

38

39.8

41.3

43.2

Port.

77.3

80.8

79.8

74.2

78.7

275

NATO Press Release, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” 19 February
2009. NATO calculations allocate total defense expenditure to four categories: personnel, equipment,
infrastructure, and “other.”
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Note on NATO and Member Sovereignty
NATO “operates as a „loose‟ or unintegrated structure in which sovereign allies
maintain both policy independence and discretionary power over military
expenditures.”276 In general, the “member states have not committed themselves to go
along with any decision that they disagree with.”277 More specifically,
[T]he allies decide the overwhelming portion of their defense spending
independently. . . . For the 1970s, common funding was a little less than
1 percent of NATO‟s total defense spending, so that over 99 percent . . .
[was] at the discretion of the allies. . . . Although allies discuss defense
strategies, weapon requirements, and defense planning, actual defense
outlays are primarily decided at the country level, where domestic tradeoffs and political influence affect the outcome. Even when agreements to
increase defense spending are [made] – for example, the pledged 3 percent
increase in real defense spending given at a 1978 Council meeting – there
is no provision to enforce such agreements.278
The Treaty‟s organizational provisions do not incorporate any requirement of
unanimity for action by its members, except with respect to the admission of new
members.279 Consultation among members is prescribed; but there is no provision for
“majority rule” binding on a minority, or any other means to compel assent by an
unwilling member. Thus, members may agree on and undertake joint action without
unanimous consent; but their decisions do not bind dissenters. Neither, however, does
any member have a “veto” over policy or joint action.280

276

Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and Into the
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 27.
277
Ibid. at p. 27.
278
Ibid., pp. 27-28.
279
Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949; in The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson
Subcommittee Hearings and Findings, Documents, p. 282.
280
The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings, p. 20.
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Even in the event of an “armed attack against one or more” members – under
Article 5, to be considered “an attack against them all” -- each state is required only to
render such aid “as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. . . .”281 Action
is not formally obligatory under the terms of the Treaty. This “loose” alliance structure
was deemed sufficient, since a Soviet assault on Western Europe, the chief military
hazard against which NATO was formed, would present so obvious and immediate a
threat to members generally that all could be expected to appreciate the need for (and to
contribute to) a mutual defensive effort.
In sum, the NATO member states retain essentially all of their sovereign authority
on defense matters, including decisions on spending, force structure, and military
deployments.

281

Article 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949; in The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee
Hearings and Findings, Documents, p. 282.
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